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Abstract Professors Butler and Ribstein present an extensive analysis of opting out of
fiduciary duties, based on the contractual theory of the corporation and a substantial body
of economic literature, as well as a comprehensive response to prominent corporate law
commentators who have argued that private ordering of corporate manager duties should
be restricted by mandatory legal rules.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout much of the history of corporate law, courts and schol-
ars have debated the nature of the corporation and the proper role of
government regulation in internal corporate affairs. Today, the clear-
est controversy is between the contractarians and anti-contractarians
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about the proper regard for freedom of contract in the corporation.
Contractarians view the corporation as a set of private contractual
relationships among providers of capital and services.' Anti-con-
tractarians argue that the corporation is either not a contract at all, or
at least is subject to more intrusive government regulation than other
contracts.2
As the contractual theory of the corporation gained support from
economists and lawyers in recent years,3 it provoked harsh responses
1. It is fashionable to refer to the corporation under the private contract approach as a "nexus
of contracts." See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior Agency Costs,
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ANALYSIS 305, 311 (1976) ("The private corporation or firm
is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships .... ").
This terminology is appropriate as long as it is clearly understood that it does not necessarily
imply that the corporation exists as an entity apart from the contracts among its participants.
The entity theory appears to support the approach that the "entity" is brought into being, and
therefore subject to extensive regulation (either through direct administrative regulation or
litigation) by the state. We will eschew language that lends itself to a priori treatment of
corporations as different from other contractual relationships. The corporation is, indeed, a
bundle of interrelated contractual relationships, but there is no conceptual justification for
reifying this interrelationship.
2. The anti-contractarian view owes much to the historical concept of the corporation as a
concession of the state. For a discussion comparing the contract and concession views of the
corporation, see R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION (1979). For a discussion of the
historical origins of the anti-contractarian view, see infra Section II(A)..
3. The literature is far too extensive to list, but several of the major contributions to this
literature are included in this Note. On the economics of the firm, see Alchian & Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972);
Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J. L. & ECON. 179
(1985) [hereinafter Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law]; Cheung, The Contractual
Nature of the Firm, 26 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1983); Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EONOMICA 386
(1937); Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983);
Jensen & Meckling, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.
L. & EcON. 233 (1979); Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents,
and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Manne, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). Legal commentaries reflecting this
contractual theory include N. WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION: FREE MARKETS
VERSUS REGULATION (1984); Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial
Entrenchment, and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 VA. L. REV. 1257 (1985)
[hereinafter Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover Amendments]; Butler, The Contractual Theory of
the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99 (1989); Butler & Ribstein, The Contract Clause and
the Corporation, to be published in 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. - (1989) [hereinafter Butler &
Ribstein, Contract Clause]; Butler & Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract
Clause, 57 U. CIN. L.. REV. 611 (1988) [hereinafter Butler & Ribstein, Anti-Takeover]; Fischel,
The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982); Haddock, Macey &
McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REv. 701
(1987); Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract: Law Meets Economics, 78 GEO.
L.J. 71 (1989) [hereinafter Ribstein, Takeover Defenses]; Ribstein, An Applied Theory of Limited
Partnership, 37 EMORY L.J. 837 (1988) [hereinafter Ribstein, Limited Partnership].
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from numerous traditional legal scholars.4 One indication of the
influence of the contractual theory is that anti-contractarians have
been forced to attack the legitimacy of private ordering as well as the
consistency of the economic theories supporting it. This Article dem-
onstrates that the anti-contractarian attack on private contracting is
flawed in many respects. But it must be answered to prevent the mis-
conception that the state should have a greater role in corporate gov-
ernance than in other private contractual relationships.
An important recent battleground of the debate over freedom of
contract in the corporation is the question of whether the fiduciary
duties of corporate managers should be subject to private ordering
through contract or should be to some extent law-imposed and non-
waivable. This important policy question has been brought to the
forefront by developments in the wake of the Delaware Supreme
Court's unprecedented holding in favor of director negligence liability
in Smith v. Van Gorkom.5 Among other reactions to this case, the
Delaware corporation law, followed by other state statutes, 6 was
amended to permit charter amendments opting out of the director
duty of care.7 Also, the Smith case gave new importance to an earlier
proposal in drafts of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance permitting limitation of director liability by charter
amendment.8
In this Article, we present a comprehensive response to prominent
corporate law commentators who have argued that private ordering of
corporate manager duties should be restricted by mandatory rules.9
4. See, e.g., Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985) [hereinafter Brudney, Corporate Governance].
5. 488 A.2d 858, 864 (Del. 1985).
6. Citations are collected in PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 275 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1988) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988); see infra note 300. For a discussion of
other reactions, see Gelb, Director Due Care Liability: An Assessment of the New Statutes, 61
TEMPLE L. REV. 13 (1988); Hazen, Corporate Directors' Accountability: The Race to the
Bottom-The Second Lap, 66 N.C.L. REv. 171 (1987).
8. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.17 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1989). Liability limitation was first
proposed in PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.06 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982). The current proposal,
refined from the original version, was first set forth in PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.17 (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1986). The American Law Institute's ("A.L.I." 's) corporate governance project
has been very controversial, possibly because of its attempt to go beyond the traditional
restatement to include recommendations for changes in the law. Representative samples of the
literature include symposia in 71 CORN. L. REV. 261 (1986) and 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 557
(1984).
9. Two important articles on which we focus our attention are Brudney, Corporate
Governance, supra note 4, and Coffee, No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 919 (1988) [hereinafter
Coffee, No Exit]. Professor Coffee's ideas are particularly influential, since he is Reporter for the
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The opposition to private ordering is deeply flawed not only because it
is based on a rejection of the contractual nature of the corporation, but
also because the critics either ignore, dismiss as irrelevant, or misapply
a substantial body of economic theory.
Section II sets the stage for the debate by establishing the basic con-
tractual nature of the corporation. It begins by summarizing the con-
tractual theory of the corporation-the theory that the corporation is
the product of private contracts among corporate participants. It then
critiques anti-contractarian concepts of the corporation, including the
view that the corporation is a privilege or concession granted by the
state. The concession view of the corporation is a holdover from the
Remedies Section (Part VII) of the A.L.I. project (although his article, id. at 919 n.*, includes
the caveat that he is not speaking for the A.L.I.). Although we do not discuss in detail other
articles by Brudney and Coflee, it is fair to say that the anti-private ordering view expressed in
the articles we discuss is reflected in their other writings. See, e.g., Brudney & Clark, A New
Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1981) (opposing private ordering of
corporate opportunity liability); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and
Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REv. 297 (1974) (favoring rules allocating merger gains); Coffee, Beyond
the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal
Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977) (legal rules may be necessary to supplement internal
monitoring devices); Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control. A Critical Assessment
of the Tender Offer!; Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984) [hereinafter
Coffee, Regulating the Market] (suggesting that legal regulation may be necessary to supplement
the market for control in disciplining managers); Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The
Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1986) (indicating need to regulate corporate
control market to protect nonshareholder interests); Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Takeover
Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435 (1986).
We also respond to the following papers presented at the Columbia University Law and
Economics Center Conference on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, December 9-10,
1988: Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desireable Constraints on
Charter Amendments, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1820 (1989); Black, Corporate Law Trivial? A Political
and Economic Analysis, to be published in 84 Nw. U.L. REv. - (1990); Clark, Contracts, Elites,
and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703 (1989) [hereinafter
Clark, Contracts Elites]; Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay
on the Judicial Role, 89 COLTUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989) [hereinafter Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling];
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, (ch. 1 of THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW, forthcoming Harv. Univ. Press); Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation
Law, 89 COLUM. L. Rav. 1461 (1989); Gordon, Freedom & Constraint in Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989). All of these articles except those by Easterbrook & Fischel, and
Black present rationales for mandatory corporate rules.
For examples of other articles advocating limiting private ordering of corporate manager
duties, see Anderson, Conflicts of Interests: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25
UCLA L. REv. 738, 756, 760 (1978); Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail
the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375
(1988); Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhausers, eds. 1985)'[hereinafter Clark, Agency
Costs]; DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879;
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 813, 821 n.83 (1983). Professor Brudney
specifically acknowledged the influence of Professor Clark's article. Brudney, Corporate
Governance, supra note 4, at 1403 n.*.
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early history of corporate law and is inconsistent both with current
usage and with a formidable body of legal and economics scholar-
ship." Several of the recurrent themes in the criticism of the contrac-
tual theory are set forth in preparation for a more specific analysis in
later parts.
Section III, which is structured around brief summaries of the mar-
ket and contractual mechanisms that govern intra-corporate relations,
responds to the critics by demonstrating their lack of appreciation for
the complementary roles of such mechanisms in aligning managers'
and shareholders' interests. Contrary to arguments by critics of pri-
vate ordering, we demonstrate that the corporate contract includes
many mechanisms for protection against managerial misconduct."
Moreover, the existence of fiduciary duties and remedies for breach
should be viewed as part of this contractual protection rather than
contrary to the contractual theory of the corporation. In some situa-
tions, the inadequacy of market constraints on managerial conduct
may lead the parties to a corporate contract to choose to supplement
market controls by contracting for fiduciary remedies."1 Our analysis
demonstrates that, even if the parties sometimes determine that liabil-
ity rules are appropriate, as long as securities markets adequately dis-
cipline contractual choices, shareholders should be permitted to opt
out of these rules.
Section IV brings economic theory to bear on the issue of enforce-
ability of waivers of managerial duties. Where terms are enforced
against shareholders who buy into the corporation after the waiver is
enacted, it is clear that the basic question is one of pricing: in light of
the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, 3 differences between corpo-
rations regarding management duties and the potential for managerial
misconduct are reflected in the prices of the securities of those compa-
nies. This efficient market pricing provides pressure toward develop-
ment of optimal contract terms, including the optimal reliance on legal
constraints such as fiduciary duties. Nor is there any justification for
10. See R. HESSEN, supra note 2; see also Anderson & Tollison, The Myth of the Corporation
as a Creation of the State, 3 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 107 (1983); Butler & Ribstein, Anti-
Takeover, supra note 3, at 618-22; Butler & Ribstein, Contract Clause, supra note 3.
I1. When we refer to managerial misconduct, we simply mean conduct that is contrary to
investor interests. Such "misconduct" may or may not breach express or implied contractual
duties. In fact, the extent to which corporate contracts should constrain managerial conduct that
diverges from investor interests is an important question in corporate planning. See infra notes
185-186 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Section III(H).
13. See infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
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refusing to enforce contract terms permitting amendment, since mar-
ket forces constrain both the scope of the amendment power in the
initial contract and the amendment process itself. On the other hand,
provisions limiting amendment should also be enforced.
Section V demonstrates that even if one accepts the arguments of
anti-contractarians concerning deficiencies in the operation of markets
affecting corporate governance, serious questions remain concerning
the efficiency of the alternative to private ordering-mandatory terms.
Thus, even if the relative merits of private ordering as compared with
mandatory rules are debatable, the burden of proof should be on those
who advocate regulation of corporate contracts. Anti-contractarians
have fallen considerably short of meeting this burden.
Section VI distinguishes mandatory rules under federal and state
law. The attacks on private ordering implicitly support federal inter-
vention in the internal affairs of corporations. The anti-contractarians'
arguments do not justify the tremendous costs that such intervention
would entail.
Section VII sets forth concluding remarks.
II. THE CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF THE
CORPORATION
The contractual theory of the corporation states that the corpora-
tion is a set of contracts among the participants in the business, includ-
ing shareholders, managers, creditors, employees and others.14 The
terms of the agency contract include the provisions of state law, which
are regarded as a standard form that can be accepted by the parties or
rejected either by drafting around the provision or by incorporating in
another state.15 The corporate contract also specifies the extent to
which the parties rely on the competitive pressures from capital, prod-
uct, and managerial labor markets as well as internal incentive struc-
tures such as corporate hierarchy, boards of directors and managerial
compensation contracts, to force agents to act in their shareholders'
best interests. 6 The policy implication is that private parties to the
14. The legal corporate governance debate tends to focus on the internal corporate
relationship between managers (a term that includes officers and directors) and shareholders.
15. As discussed in Section VI(D), the role of state law in governance of the corporation is
consistent with private ordering under conditions of jurisdictional choice in the market for
corporate charters. Conversely, federal regulation of the corporation is consistent with the anti-
contractarian position.
16. These corporate governance mechanisms are discussed infra notes 85-117 and
accompanying text.
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corporate contract should be free to order their affairs in whatever
manner they find appropriate.
An important thread of the anti-contractarian position is the idea
that corporate arrangements are sufficiently different from "ordinary"
contracts that they deserve to be regulated by the state. This concept
of the corporation derives from the concession theory of the corpora-
tion, which holds that incorporation is a state-conferred privilege. A
corollary of this concept is that mandatory regulation of corporate
contracts does not need to meet the same tests of validity as does regu-
lation of "ordinary" contracts. It is therefore important to critically
examine at the outset arguments questioning the contractual nature of
the corporation.
A. Historical Arguments: The Concession Theory
An important cornerstone of the anti-contractarian view of the cor-
poration is that, in the words of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr.,
"[h]istorically, American corporate law has never regarded the corpo-
ration as simply a private contract."' 7 The obvious implication is that
the history of corporate law supports increasing government involve-
ment in the corporation today. There are several problems with the
historical analogy.
Certainly it is true that very early American corporate law imported
from England the then-current theory that the corporation was a crea-
ture of state law. This theory was consistent with the fact that early
corporations were state-created franchises or quasi-public institutions.
Even after the franchise or quasi-public character of corporations
became much less important, corporations continued to be created by
special legislative acts, thereby preserving the image of state crea-
tion. 8 Thus, consistently with the accepted wisdom of the time, the
Supreme Court in its 1819 decision, Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
17. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 939 (footnote omitted).
18. For a discussion of the evolution of American corporate law from special to general
incorporation, with an emphasis on how market forces broke down state control of the
corporation, see Butler, Nineteenth Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of
Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGIS. STUD. 129 (1985) [hereinafter Butler, Jurisdictional
Competition]. Along similar lines, see Butler, General Incorporation in Nineteenth Century
England: Interaction of Common Law and Legislative Processes, 6 INT'L REV. OF L. & ECON.
169, 170-71 (1986). Curiously, in light of the evolutionary theme of these articles, Coffee cites
the latter article for the proposition that "historical research by economists suggests that
corporate law originally perceived the corporation to be purely a private contract." See Coffee,
No Exit, supra note 9, at 939 n.42.
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Woodward, 19 characterized the corporation as an "artificial being,
existing solely in contemplation of state law."20
Throughout the nineteenth century, under the onslaught of increas-
ingly permissive general incorporation statutes, state creation gradu-
ally yielded to private formation of the corporation and private
ordering of the corporate relationship.21 This has, in fact, been the
dominant trend in corporate law over the last two hundred years. 22
As Professor Coffee says, "corporate law has moved far from its origi-
nal position, which saw corporations as quasi-public bodies, to become
a largely enabling body of law. ' 23
Despite the demise of the state-creation foundation of the conces-
sion theory, the courts and commentators continue to pay lip-service
to the theory itself. Most importantly, the Supreme Court recently
repeated approvingly the ancient dictum from the Dartmouth College
case quoted above.24 This indicates that the origins of the corporation
continue to rule from the grave.
This blind adherence to an outmoded theory does not, however,
provide a normative argument against the contractarian view. If the
contractual theory of the corporation is subject to credible attack, the
19. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
20. Id. at 636.
21. These developments are traced in Butler, Jurisdictional Competition, supra note 18.
22. See J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 1780-1970 (1970); Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1441 (1987).
23. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 939. Professor Brudney, taking a somewhat different
tack, argues that the evolution of corporate law from concession to contract merely
disconnect[s] the enterprise and its 'owners'... from dependence upon state authority for
their power, and therefore from subjection to state regulation of that power in the interest of
consumers, employees, suppliers and the public. The relation of investors, particularly
stockholders, to management was not at the core of that conceptual evolutionary process.
The current 'nexus-of-contracts' rhetoric may be seen as an extension by modem economists
of that evolution to the investor-management relationship.
Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1409-10. Brudney offers no authority for this
reading of history, in fact conceding that public investors are exempted from private ordering as
buyers rather than as owners. Id. at 1409 n.17. Moreover, it is clear that the "conceptual evolu-
tionary process" has embraced all elements of the contractual relationship. See J. HURST, supra
note 22.
24. CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987). It is important
to keep in mind that outside the limited areas of federal supremacy, corporation law is
predominantly determined by state courts rather than by the United States Supreme Court. For
an attempt to turn the long history of concession-based doctrine into a normative theory of
corporate law, see Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from
History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1989).
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attack must be on policy grounds, including economic theory, and not
by reliance on the past.25
B. Mandatory Provisions in Modern Corporate Law
Despite shedding their state-creation origins, modem corporate
statutes do include many mandatory terms, including voting rules,
fiduciary duties and legal capital rules. Some commentators believe
that these terms cast in doubt the contractual nature of the corpora-
tion.26 This conclusion does not follow for several reasons.
First, most apparently mandatory terms are so easily avoided that
they are, in substance, optional. If company A wants to acquire com-
pany B but does not want the shareholders of A to vote as apparently
required by the corporate statute, 7 it can accomplish the merger by
establishing subsidiary C. 2  Corporation A may even be able to avoid
offering target shareholders "mandatory" appraisal rights29 by buying
B's assets and liquidating it.3° The legal capital provisions of some
corporation statutes require payment of dividends out of "surplus,"'"
but permit manipulation of the surplus account.32 These optional
terms in mandatory disguise are a sign of the evolution of the corpora-
tion from state concession to private contract.33
Second, some apparently "mandatory" fiduciary duties are implied
contract provisions that supply terms the parties did not agree on, but
which can be avoided by explicit terms. 34 For example, in Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 35 the court accorded non-
controlling close corporation shareholders access to share buyouts
25. The substantial body of economic theory supporting the contract view of the corporation
is discussed infra notes 79-117. For a more extensive argument that corporation law should shed
its concession origins and embrace the contract theory, see Butler & Ribstein, Anti-Takeover,
supra note 3, at 618-22.
26. See Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1414-1415 n.29; Coffee, No Exit,
supra note 9, at 939-40; Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1486-87; Gordon, supra note 9, at 1553.
27. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1983 & Supp. 1988).
28. See Black, supra note 9, citing this as an example of the "triviality" of corporate law.
29. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (1983 & Supp. 1988).
30. See Hariton v. Arco Elec., Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 (1963). But see Farris v.
Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
31. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (1983).
32. See, e.g., id. § 244(a)(4) (board may increase surplus by reducing capital amounts in
excess of par). See generally B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL (2d ed.
1985).
33. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (distinguishing implied and imposed
contract terms).
35. 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
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equal to that enjoyed by controlling shareholders. In light of the lim-
ited market for close corporation stock and the difficulty of exit, recog-
nition of such an implied duty is either consistent with actual
expectations of the parties, or an appropriate implied standard form
provision that anticipates what the parties would have drafted if they
had focused on the situation.36 As such, the duty does not limit opting
out as one writer has argued,37 but is simply part of the parties'
contract.38
Third, corporations can opt out of even some "mandatory" terms
simply by reincorporating in another jurisdiction. For example, a
company that finds a Model Act-type "mandatory" appraisal provi-
sion overly restrictive can reincorporate in Delaware. In the same
way, shareholders can choose "mandatory" terms-perhaps as a
check on the amendment power. 39 The evolution of mandatory and
non-mandatory provisions can be seen as an outcome of the state com-
petition for chartering," and therefore as an aspect of private order-
ing. In fact, this is the basic process involved in the evolution from
special chartering and strict limitations on corporate powers to the
enabling, general-incorporation approach of modern corporation
law.41
Fourth, the parties to a firm can opt out of terms that are
mandatory for all corporations simply by choosing among different
investment and organizational forms.4 2  For example, the
"mandatory" requirement of at least majority shareholder voting on
significant corporate transactions can be avoided by disincorporating
into a limited partnership.4 3 Alternatively, the impact of the require-
ment can be drastically altered by converting equity into non-voting
debt through a leveraged buyout or other restructuring.
In sum, truly "mandatory" provisions are the exception rather than
the rule in the law of business associations. The most important
36. For a contrary view on this specific question, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Close
Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271, 294 (1986).
37. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 939-40.
38. To see this point, consider what the result in Donahue would have been if all of the parties
had explicitly contracted that the corporation could purchase stock owned by controlling
shareholders without buying stock owned by the minority.
39. See infra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 308-314 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
42. See infra Sections 111(A), III(B).
43. Limited partners have only those voting rights gr nted them by the partnership
agreement. See REVISED UNIFORM LIMrrED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 302, 6 U.L.A. 300 (1989).
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mandatory provisions are the federal securities laws and state provi-
sions that are imposed on existing investors in firms.' While these
provisions are not trivial, they do not establish the non-contractual
nature of the corporation. More importantly, this resort to positive
law is no more powerful in refuting the contract theory of the corpora-
tion than the resort to history. The anti-contractarian theory is a nor-
mative view.45 As such, it can rest, if at all, on policy, including
economic theory.
C. Adhesion and Freedom of Choice: The Formation of the
Corporate Contract
Professor Victor Brudney, one of the leading anti-contractarian
commentators, has expressed the view that the corporation should not
be treated like other contracts because the parties do not enter into the
arrangement in the same way as they do other contracts:
[I]t is erroneous to use the term "contract" to describe dispersed stock-
holders' relation to the "original owner" or to corporate management, if
by doing so the user assimilates the assumptions about parties' volition
and cognition in conventionally bargained and closed buy-sell contracts
to the circumstances that attend the connection between purchase or
sale of stock and the long term, open ended "contracts" between man-
agement and its corporation.
46
Later Brudney says: "It stretches the concept 'contract' beyond rec-
ognition to use it to describe either the process of bargaining or the
arrangements between investors of publicly held corporations and
either theoretical owners first going public or corporate
management."
47
These quotes reveal two separate concerns Brudney has about using
the "rhetoric of contract" in the corporate setting.48 First, there is the
"volition" problem, giving rise to what Brudney refers to as a contract
of adhesion. Second, there is the concern that parties to the corporate
contract do not have enough information in order to appreciate and
consent to the terms. Both of these objections are unfounded.
44. See infra Section VI.
45. See McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of
Eisenberg, 89 COLUM L. REV. 1530, 1539 (1989).
46. Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1406 (footnotes omitted).
47. Id. at 1412.
48. For similar concerns, see Clark, Contracts, Elites, supra note 9, at 1718; Eisenberg, supra
note 9, at 1477-80.
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L The "'Adhesion"Analysis
According to Brudney, shareholders do not freely consent to corpo-
rate arrangements as in "conventional" contracts. Rather, dispersed
shareholders must accept, without any direct bargaining over details
or alternatives, package deals crafted by managers. 9 In this respect,
Brudney vastly overstates the shareholders' plight. In fact, investors
are offered a formidable array of investment alternatives-including
corporations with different capital and ownership structures, 50 and
such diverse investments as limited partnerships, 51 mutual funds,
money market accounts, real estate, and simple savings accounts.
Clearly investors are not forced to accept any particular investment. If
contractual volition is lacking-if, as Brudney argues, these are "adhe-
sion" contracts-it is only in the sense that investors do not dicker
over individual terms, but accept contractual packages. This wide
range of choices among "adhesion" contracts means, in effect, that
there is no such thing as an adhesion contract.
Brudney's analysis is deficient because there is no argument here, as
has been made, for example, in the consumer product area,52 that con-
sumers are "forced" to accept manufacturers' terms.5 3 Adhesion in
the sense of an absence of individualized bargaining is a common fea-
ture in the world of contract, ranging from standardized warranties,
leases, trust indentures and employment contracts. 4 Thus, Brudney
rejects the corporation as contract only by defining "contract" in a
special sense of individualized bargaining that would exclude most
modern consensual arrangements.
49. Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1412-14, 1424, 1437.
50. See infra Sections III(B), III(G).
51. See generally Ribstein, Limited Partnership, supra note 3.
52. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (refusing to
enforce industry-wide warranty provision). Corporate and consumer contracts are distinguished
infra Section IV(D).
53. We do not assume that there is an enforceability problem even under the very different
conditions in the Henningsen-type setting. Among other things, even if all firms adhere to the
same standard, that may be because of the efficiency of standardization. See infra notes 56-57
and accompanying text. Only if a firm has market power does a potential argument arise in this
respect, and even in that situation the grounds for interference with private ordering are at least
questionable.
54. See Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981)
(explaining how optimal contracts can be produced in the absence of bargaining).
55. For other arguments that the absence of bargaining is unimportant to the existence of a
contract, see Hetherington, Redefining the Task ofCorporation Law, 19 U.S.F. L. REv. 229, 256
(1985); Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constrants, 91 YALE L.J.
1521, 1522 (1982).
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Aside from being out of step with the general world of contract, the
contract advocated by Brudney is not even a superior product. For
many reasons, a contracting party does not usually want to "have it
my way," but is often willing to accept the manufacturer's or corpora-
tion's package. In fact, because sellers often offer the terms they
believe buyers will want, it may be impossible to determine who is
dictating the terms of a contract by merely identifying the printer of
the contract. Although there is always the chance that the terms
could be improved through dickering, this is a costly process in terms
of time, attorneys' fees, and other transaction costs.
Not only is the extra cost of a customized contract usually not
worth the benefit of dickering, but in many situations a standardized
contract is a better one: there is more information available concerning
a standardized form; important terms have been clarified by interpre-
tation; and error costs and information costs are less than in individu-
ally negotiated deals.56 In striking contrast with Brudney's view,
Professor Coffee, another leading anti-contractarian, is confident
enough about the virtues of "brand name" standard forms that he
insists that all contracting around corporate duties be done in this
way.57 Thus, even within the anti-contractarian camp, there is consid-
erable support for the proposition that the "adhesion problem" is not a
real problem.
2. The Information Problem
Professor Brudney's second concern about using the "rhetoric of
contract" in the corporate context is that the average investor lacks
56. See Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REV.
667, 686 (standard bond forms save drafting costs and facilitate efficient market pricing); Goetz
& Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 265-73 (1985) (discussing formulation errors as
a primary factor in the development of standard terms); Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts,
47 S. CALIF. L. REV. 691, 771 (1974) [hereinafter Macneil, Many Futures] (standardization of
contract increases confidence of contracting party in the deal). As to reduced information costs,
see Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
965 (1981):
A large degree of uniformity in the language of debenture indentures is essential to the
effective functioning of the financial markets; uniformity of the indentures that govern
competing debenture issues is what makes it possible meaningfully to compare one
debenture issue with another, focusing only on the business provisions of the issue (such as
the interest rate, the maturity date, the redemption and sinking fund provisions and the
conversion rate) and the economic conditions of the issuer, without being misled by
peculiarities in the underlying instruments.
For further discussion of the costs and benefits of standardized contracts, see infra Sections
IV(E), V(C).
57. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 971-74; see infra Section V(C).
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sufficient information about the terms of the package he is buying.58
Professor Coffee makes a related argument that we cannot rely on the
market to efficiently price alterations of director duties, raising ques-
tions about the efficiency of the terms themselves. 59 These are really
arguments that the corporate contract should not be enforced accord-
ing to its terms rather than that it is not a contract at all. We return to
this issue for an extended discussion in Section IV.
Interestingly enough, Professor Brudney is more willing to accept
the contractual nature of bondholder rights as against the residual
claimant.6 This is certainly puzzling, since the same elements of
"adhesion" to standard forms would apply in this context, and the
same types of "uninformed" investors who buy common stocks also
buy bonds.6" If there is a difference between bondholder and share-
holder rights, it is not that one is contractual and the other is not, but
merely in the degree to which the rights are specified in the contract. 62
This distinction is not sufficient to support Professor Brudney's view
that shareholders need or deserve greater protections than those
afforded to bondholders via contract.
In general, the issue here should not be what is, and what is not, a
"contract" in some abstract sense. Concerns about information and
adhesion problems in the corporation amount to a conclusion that vol-
untary arrangements in the corporation are not, like other voluntary
arrangements, presumptively efficient. 63 This conclusion depends on
the viability of markets in this setting,61 and is therefore appropriately
the subject of economic analysis. The issue cannot be resolved by
labels.
58. Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1414-20, 1436-37.
59. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 941-48.
60. Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1414 n.28, 1427-28 n.62.
61. See Bratton, supra note 56, at 699-703 (noting information and sophistication problems
affecting bondholders). If there is a difference between bondholders and-shareholders it would
seem that the former are likely to be even more naive and less informed since they are purchasing
the more secure investment. In fact, both bondholders and shareholders are rationally ignorant
about their investments. See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
62. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 233 (1988) (bondholder
contract is contingent and explicit while shareholder contract is relational and implicit).
Commentators have disagreed concerning whether the bondholder contract should be
supplemented by fiduciary duties. Compare Bratton, supra note 56, at 735-39 (arguing for
expansive interpretation of the convertible bond contract rather than fiduciary duties) with
McDaniel, supra (arguing for fiduciary duties to bondholders). As argued infra Section III(H),
fiduciary duties may be regarded as contractual rather than regulatory in nature.
63. See Gilson & Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: The Implicit Contract
for Associates, 41 STAN. L.J. 567, 569 (1989).
64. See infra Section IV.
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D. The Corporation as "Implicit" Contract
Professor Melvin A. Eisenberg argues that the corporation should
not be regarded as fundamentally contractual partly because many of
the terms governing the corporate relationship are merely "implicit
bargains" and not real contracts. 65 An implicit bargain is a term used
in labor economics to refer to terms that, like real bargains, involve an
economic quid pro quo. They are not "real" contracts because they
are enforced by market, rather than legal, mechanisms.6 6 For example,
Gilson and Mnookin argue that the legally enforceable "up or out"
(fire or promote) rule67 applied to law firm associates bonds the firm's
implicit and non-legally enforceable promise not to use its promotion
power opportunistically.
68
The fact that many of the parties to a corporation are governed
largely by implicit terms supports rather than undermines the contract
theory of the corporation. The choice of implicit and explicit terms is
one of many examples of how the parties, if unhindered by legal rules,
choose the combination of legal and extra-legal devices appropriate to
their relationship.69 It is a clear nonsequitur to say that because the
parties to firms sometimes choose implicit instead of legally enforcea-
ble terms they should be forced to submit to mandatory legal rules.
More specifically, the parties' choice of market mechanisms to support
an implicit promise by managers not to behave opportunistically
should not be trumped by mandatory fiduciary duties.
E. Hypothetical Versus Actual Bargains
Some commentators argue for a normative view of corporate law as
a hypothetical bargain. Thus, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook and
Professor Daniel R. Fischel have written: "Corporate law should con-
tain the terms people would have negotiated, were the costs of negoti-
ating at arms'-length for every contingency sufficiently low ....
65. See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1487-88; Eisenberg, Golden Parachutes and the Myth of the
Web, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS 155, 158 (Coffee, Lowenstein, & Rose-Ackerman
eds. 1988).
66. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 63, at 569; Rosen, Implicit Contracts: A Survey, 23 J.
ECON. LIT. 1144, 1148-49 (1985). See generally Bull, Implicit Contracts in the Absence of
Enforcement and Risk Aversion, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 658 (1983)
67. This term is legally enforceable in the sense that it gives the firm the legal right to fire
associates without according them a partners' job security.
68. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 63. More specifically, the "up-or-out" rule prevents the
firm from continuing to use the services of lawyers who the firm believes merit partnership
without paying them partners' shares of the profits.
69. For other examples, see infra Section III.
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[C]orporate law almost always conforms to this model. It is enabling
rather than directive."70
Despite the market orientation of this view and the characterization
by Easterbrook and Fischel of the hypothetical bargain as "enabling,"
their normative view can be inconsistent with the contract theory of
the corporation. The problem is that it is one thing to propound a
default rule to cover situations not covered in the parties' contract,
and another thing to state a general rule applicable irrespective of con-
tract.71 For example, Easterbrook and Fischel would mandate a rule
of incumbent management passivity in takeovers in order to effectuate
the market for control. 72  By contrast, under the contract theory,
while the hypothetical bargain is a suitable default rule, the parties
should be able to customize management's power to resist takeovers.73
It is, therefore, a mistake to identify the hypothetical bargain
approach with the contract theory of the corporation. Yet several
commentators have done just that, and have then proceeded to criti-
cize the contract theory because the hypothetical bargain approach is
inconsistent with it,74 or otherwise defective.75 If anything, the defects
of the hypothetical bargain approach provide another argument in
favor of the contract theory: To the extent that courts and legislators
follow this approach in adopting default provisions, it is important to
permit the parties to opt out of it in order to escape its defects.
70. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 15; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 702 (1982).
71. For a discussion of the difference between these two approaches and the problem of
enforcing mandatory rules in the form of judicially imposed fiduciary duties, see infra notes
126-29 and accompanying text.
72. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1194-1204 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel,
Proper Role]. Easterbrook and Fischel in their more recent writings have endorsed defensive
control policies approved by shareholders prior to takeover bids. See EASTERBROOK &
JARRELL, SEPARATE STATEMENT TO REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS 16-18 (1983); Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the
Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 119, 150-51 (1987).
73. See Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, supra note 3, at 1302-03; Haddock,
Macey & McChesney, supra note 3, at 716; Ribstein, Takeover Defenses, supra note 3, at 106.
74. See Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1415 n.29, 1432 n.74 (criticizing the
"'schizophrenia' implicit in the contractarian approach"); Clark correctly identifies the
hypothetical bargain approach as an example of rulemaking by elites, but then mischaracterizes
it as "contractually oriented." Clark, Contracts, Elites; supra note 9, at 1723; see also Clark,
Agency Costs, supra note 9, at 63-71 (characterizing hypothetical bargains as non-consensual).
75. See Clark, Agency Costs, supra note 9, at 63-71 (hypothetical bargain may not be
efficient); Gordon, supra note 9, at 1550-51 (characterizing the hypothetical bargain as the
"content" premise of contractarianism), 1594 (criticizing Kaldor-Hicks basis of hypothetical
bargain).
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F Conclusion: The Basis of the Debate
This Section establishes that there is no a priori reason for subject-
ing corporate governance to more extensive government regulation
than other contracts. The anti-contractarian view can only be sus-
tained on policy grounds, and not by claiming that the corporation is
somehow not a "contract." The following three Sections discuss these
policy arguments.
III. CONTRACTUAL CONSTRAINTS ON MANAGEMENT
CONDUCT
Opponents of private ordering, in looking at the corporate contract,
see significant gaps in shareholder protection from managerial miscon-
duct. For example, Professor Coffee passes off the idea of contractual
protection for shareholders by simply noting: "[W]hen we look to the
real world, we can observe very few, if any, instances of anything
approaching... bonding behavior [by corporate managers]."76 This
view is clearly mistaken.
We demonstrate in this Section that the corporate contract does, in
fact, offer significant protection to investors.77 We evaluate the many
76. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 942-43. Professor Coffee limits his critique of contractual
devices constraining agency problems, id. at 943-44, to management compensation arrangements
(see discussion infra Section III(E)), curiously neglecting discussion in this article even of the
market for corporate control. For Coffee's skepticism concerning the effectivenes of the market
for control, see generally Coffee, Regulating the Market, supra note 9.
Professor Brudney is similarly skeptical about contractual protection of shareholders. See
Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1421-22, 1426-27, 1429. Like Coffee, he
questions the force of individual aspects of investors' protections from managerial misconduct.
For examples of this form of criticism, see id. at 1420-21 (questioning efficacy of market for
managers), 1430-31 n.72 (questioning efficacy of "M-form" organization); see infra notes
103-106 and accompanying text. Moreover, as he does in evaluating the contractual nature of
the corporation, see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text, Brudney holds the terms of the
corporate contract up to an idealized preconception of what the contract ought to look like. It is
a mistake to rely on the contractual protections elaborated in recent agency theory of the
corporation, he says, because the resulting relationship does not resemble the principal's direct,
one-on-one control of the agent in the traditional agency relationship. Brudney, Corporate
Governance, supra note 4, at 1428. But this misses the point. The question is not whether the
public corporation superficially resembles other relationships that are agency in nature under
legal terminology, but whether the contract, whatever pigeonhole it is in, optimally protects
investors from management misconduct. Moreover, Brudney's distinction between corporate and
other agency relationships is inapt; even in a one-on-one agency, the principal normally does not
directly control all of the agent's actions, but rather relies on disciplinary devices that serve
precisely the same function as the market for control.
Finally, Professor Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1488-1515, extensively discusses the
inadequacies of contractual and market constraints on managers' conduct. See infra note 117.
77. Although analysis of the terms of the corporate contract is not determinative, it is
important because demonstrating that sophisticated contractual devices have been developed to
deal with a problem provides important circumstantial evidence that markets are operating
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aspects of the corporate contract that constrain managers to act con-
sistently with investor interests. In contrast to anti-contractarian
commentators like Professor Coffee, who tend to criticize the effective-
ness of individual elements of the corporate contract and aspects of the
market forces affecting the corporation,78 we sample the full range of
contracts that have developed to control corporate agency costs.
Moreover, in order to give a complete picture, we also analyze the role
of fiduciary duties and remedies in the contractual theory of the corpo-
ration. While anti-contractarian writers see these duties as mandatory
rules that supplement private ordering, under our analysis, fiduciary
duties and remedies are actually part of this contract. It follows that
shareholders should be free to alter these duties and remedies by
agreement.
A. Choice of Organizational Form
Contractual protection against agency costs is not limited to devices
within the corporation, but extends to choice of the corporate form of
contract over types of contractual organization of economic activity.
Other types of organization include economic "firms" 79 such as part-
nerships, sole proprietorships and joint ventures, and non-"firm"
"relational" contracts such as franchises and long-term supply con-
tracts.8 0 Individuals choose among types of organization by compar-
ing costs and benefits of forms, including the costs and benefits of
efficiently. We recognize that demonstrating the existence of contractual provisions dealing with
agency problems is not the same thing as demonstrating that the development of these provisions
is adequately constrained by market forces. If markets do not operate efficiently, regulation may
be necessary to produce better contractual protection. As we discuss in Section IV, markets do
operate efficiently in this context. Moreover, as we discuss in Section V, it is necessary to avoid
the "nirvana fallacy" of assuming that because markets do not operate perfectly, government
regulation would be preferable.
78. See supra note 76.
79. "Firm" is used here to refer to the economic concept of coordinating productive activity
through a process of hierarchical or bureaucratic decisionmaking rather than through the price
system and discrete contracts. The seminal contribution of Coase, supra note 3, explained use of
the firm as a way of saving transactions costs such as those of entering into contracts and
discovering prices. Later major contributions on the theory of the firm focused on other
problems. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 3, discussed the shirking problem inherent in team
production. Others discussed the problems of enforcing contracts, including post-contractual
opportunism. See 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975) [hereinafter MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES]; THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) [hereinafter 0. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS];
Cheung, supra note 3; Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 3; Williamson, Transaction Cost
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
80. Relational contracts are, in very general terms, those in which the parties' obligations are
not fully specified at the outset of the relationship as in the "classical" form of contract. The
contrast between "classical" and "relational" contracting has formed the basis of the work of
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delegating control to agents, so as to maximize their gains from engag-
ing in a particular activity. Thus, we do not observe all economic
activity being carried on through one type of organization. Instead,
we observe millions of organizations of many types, sizes and
structures.
One example of the tradeoffs inherent in choice of form concerns
the selection of close versus "open" (sometimes referred to as "pub-
lic") ownership of the firm.8 1 In closely held corporations and part-
nerships, in which all owners generally are active in control of the
business, monitoring of agents is less of a problem than in public com-
panies, in which ownership is separated from control. But public own-
ership has many benefits. Among other things, it permits
specialization of capital-raising and managerial functions and develop-
ment of a public market for the firm's stock. A public market, in turn,
accurately values the firm's assets, thereby facilitating value-increasing
investments that may not pay off before owners expect to sell out.82
The choice between the more intense monitoring of agents in the
closely held firm and the advantages of public ownership depends on
many factors. The benefits of public ownership may outweigh the
costs where decisionmaking is sufficiently complex that monitoring
and direct management cannot cheaply be combined in single individ-
uals. Also, a firm may need larger amounts of capital than can be
cheaply raised from individuals who are willing to contribute manage-
rial services (as where because of the risk of opportunistic conduct by
contracting parties83 the firm must own rather than contract for
expensive assets).
Professor Ian Macneil. See, e.g., THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980); Relational Contract:
What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483; Economic Analysis of Contractual
Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U.L. REV.
1018 (1981); Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854 (1978); Macneil, Many
Futures, supra note 56. The parties may turn to relational contracts for reasons similar to those
leading to the choice of the firm type of organization, such as reduction of post-contractual
opportunism. See Goetz & Scott, Principles ofRelational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (198 1).
In fact, relational-type contracting blends seamlessly with governance within a firm. See
Baysinger & Butler, Vertical Restraints of Trade as Contractual Integration: A Synthesis of
Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics and Organizational Theory 32
EMORY L.J. 1009 (1983).
81. See generally Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301
(1983) [hereinafter Fama & Jensen, Separation]; Fama & Jensen, Organizational Forms and
Investment Decisions, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 101 (1985) [hereinafter, Fama & Jensen, Organizational
Forms]; Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 278-79
(1967).
82. Fama & Jensen, Organizational Forms, supra note 81, at 107.
83. See supra note 80.
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In general, therefore, the profusion of forms of productive enter-
prise-including both the continuum of discrete, relational and firm-
type contracts and the various types of firms--can only be explained
as responses to the costs and benefits of various forms in particular
situations.8 4 Prominent factors in these tradeoffs are the costs and
benefits of particular ways of giving discretion to and monitoring
agents. Managerial abuse could be sharply limited simply by dividing
all enterprise into small firms that contract with each other, but this
form of organization would pose formidable problems of its own. The
profusion of contract types helps show the extent to which agency
problems are being dealt with contractually, and raises serious doubts
concerning the capacity of government regulation to devise optimal
tradeoffs.
B. Capital Market Competition and Capital Structure
In a pathbreaking 1958 article, Franco Modigliani and Merton
Miller showed that, under a set of specified assumptions including
absence of transaction and information costs, the capital structure of a
firm-that is, its selection of the mix of debt and equity financing-is
irrelevant to the total value of the firm.85 This poses a riddle: Why do
we observe different capital structures across firms?
One answer to the Modigliani-Miller riddle, given in a landmark
article by Jensen and Meckling,86 involves agency problems and moni-
toring of managers. A firm's capital structure can be analyzed as a
way of minimizing the costs of conflicts of interests between equity
and debt holders, and between management and equity holders. The
parties have the incentive to minimize these costs because they affect
the cost of equity, debt and human capital. This can be illustrated by
84. Another illustration of how choice of organizational form reflects tradeoffs of agency
costs against other benefits of the form is the selection of the franchise contract rather than fully
integrating the sales network within a single business association. See Brickley & Dark, The
Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 401 (1987); Rubin,
The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J. L. & ECON. 223 (1978).
Owning all outlets creates agency costs because the central organization must rely on monitoring
of employees by remote managers. This problem can be reduced through franchising, because
owners have greater incentives to supervise their employees than do non-owner managers. On
the other hand, franchising outlets creates the risk that the independent businesses will free-ride
on the franchisor's trademark by economizing on quality. The parties will select the contractual
form that optimizes the costs and benefits of the relationship.
85. Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
86. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EON. 305 (1976).
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considering the conflicts inherent in high equity and high debt capital
structures.
A high-equity structure gives substantial discretion to managers to
use corporate assets for their own benefit subject to the various moni-
toring and devices discussed in this Section. Managers may directly
benefit themselves at investor expense by appropriating corporate
funds for personal use and by retaining earnings beyond what can be
profitably reinvested by the company. Moreover, managers, who
because of their non-diversifiable human capital and financial invest-
ments in the firm may be more risk-averse than the diversified share-
holders, may make investments that are less risky than the
shareholders would prefer. Equity holders would demand to be com-
pensated for or protected from these risks. 87 At the same time, man-
agers may be acting consistently with debtholders' interests by
retaining earnings and avoiding risk. Indeed, the managers' human
capital investment in the firm places them somewhat in the position of
subordinated debt holders.
A debt-heavy structure, on the other hand, may be in the equity
holders' interests from a management-monitoring standpoint in the
sense that it constrains excess retention of earnings or excessive risk-
avoidance by managers.88 On the other hand, such a structure may
exacerbate the equity-debt conflict because it encourages equity hold-
ers to make highly risky investments that may produce great benefits
to the equity holders if they succeed, and losses to the debt holders if
they fail.8 9
Under the Jensen-Meckling view, different capital structures may be
responses to the different types of agency problems inherent in
87. Among other things, a high-dividend policy may align manager and shareholder interests
with regard to the level of risk. See Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74
AM. EcON. REV. 650 (1984). This may explain the long-standing puzzle as to why dividends are
paid. See, e.g., Black, The Dividend Puzzle, 2 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 5 (1976).
88. See Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV. Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 67,
69-70 [hereinafter Jensen, Eclipse] (explaining advantages of "LBO Associations" that rely on
heavy leveraging); Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76
AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986) [hereinafter Jensen, Agency Costs] (debt, unlike dividends, bonds
future payouts). This theory may explain a substantial portion of the premia paid in leveraged
buyouts. Similar considerations may explain promises in limited partnerships to maintain a
given level of payouts to the limited partners. See Ribstein, Limited Partnership, supra note 3, at
887. Note, however, that the managers may demand to be compensated for taking the insolvency
risk inherent in a high debt firm.
89. Technically these risks will be taken on the equity holders' behalf by managers to the
extent that the managers' interests are aligned with those of the shareholders. On the other
hand, as mentioned above, the managers also may act as subordinated debt holders and therefore
contrary to shareholder interests.
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different types of firms.90 Thus, for example, Alchian and Woodward
have argued that capital structure may be a function of "plasticity" of
assets: the more different uses assets are subject to, the greater the
debt-holders' problems of monitoring the risk level of managers' deci-
sions, and consequently the higher the cost of a debt-heavy capital
structure.91
The above brief discussion only scratches the surface of the complex
tradeoffs involved in designing capital structures and related contracts
that minimize agency costs. The important point is that the market is
responding to agency problems in a more sensitive way than would be
possible through mandatory legal rules.
C. Shareholder Voting Rights and the Market for Corporate Control
In a book that has had a profound impact on corporate law, Berle
and Means argued that the dispersion and passivity of public corpora-
tion shareholders disconnected ownership from control of assets, with
potentially serious consequences for the use of corporate property.92
Consistently with the Berle and Means theory, the importance of the
shareholder vote in protecting shareholders also has been minimized
by critics of private ordering. As discussed above,9 3 Professor Brud-
ney portrays public corporation shareholders as too ignorant of corpo-
rate affairs, and helpless to affect them if they were aware of them, to
be considered parties to a viable contract. He also says that sharehold-
ers are so passive and uninvolved in management that there is a "dis-
tortion in characterizing management as their agent."9'
A literature has developed over the last twenty years that establishes
that the problem is not as great as was feared by Berle and Means and
modem opponents of private ordering. This literature accepts the
basic Berle and Means characterization of shareholders' incentives,
but recognizes that other mechanisms protect shareholders. Share-
holders are, indeed, rationally ignorant in the sense that active and
informed participation in corporate affairs would involve large costs of
which an individual shareholder could capture only a small portion of
90. The choice between secured and unsecured lending may be amenable to a similar type of
explanation. See Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88
YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
901 (1986); Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting, An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN.
ECON. 117 (1979).
91. Alchian & Woodward, Reflections on the Theory of the Firm, 143 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 110, 115-17 (1987).
92. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
93. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
94. Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1428.
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the benefit.95 Nevertheless, shareholders are protected from manage-
rial misconduct by, inter alia, their right to vote for directors and on
other matters, and their right to sell their shares.96 Shareholder voting
power can be aggregated into a control bloc through purchase of
shares by a bidder for control, who thereby acquires sufficient eco-
nomic interest in the firm to make active monitoring worthwhile.97
This so-called market for corporate control provides an external
source of control over internal corporate affairs, and provides incum-
bent managers with the incentive to write optimal contracts. If the
buyer improves the firm through displacement or other change in
management, it reaps a profit as the stock price rises to reflect the
improvement.
Although anti-contractarian commentators tend to be skeptical of
the role of the tender offer in disciplining managers," considerable
evidence supports the importance of this market in protecting against
mismanagement.99 There is also evidence of the continued importance
95. See Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay in Honor of Adolf A.
Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1440-42 (1964).
96. Common shareholders generally have one vote per share of stock and may freely transfer
this vote, but only in connection with a sale of the stock. This interrelationship of voting rights
and financial interests ensures that voting will be exercised consistently with the economic
welfare of the firm. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & EcON. 395
(1983). However, this does not mean that one-share-one-vote is necessarily optimal in all
circumstances. See Fischel, supra note 72, at 139-40.
97. The seminal article is Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110 (1965); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 72.
98. See Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1425-26 n.58 (the large premia in
takeovers reflect "slack" in market discipline); Coffee, Regulating the Market, supra note 9;
Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1498 (citing the large premia necessary to gain control and the fact
that the control market does not effectively discipline takeover defenses).
99. For a review of the evidence, see Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, The Market for Corporate
Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (1988); see also R. GILSON,
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 377-86 (1986); R. GILSON & R.
KRAAKMAN, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 1989 SUPPLEMENT
27-42 (1989). Gilson notes some evidence that apparently conflicts with the displacement-of-
weak-management hypothesis, including the poor post-acquisition results of acquiring
companies. To the same effect, see Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1499. As noted in R. GILSON,
supra, at 385, the conflicting data might be explained by the fact that the existence of a viable
market for control, acting as a deterrent force, reduced the availability of poorly performing
companies. This, of course, demonstrates the continuing importance of the market for control.
Moreover, it is evidence of competition in the market for corporate control resulting in bidders
receiving a normal competitive rate of return. But it does not mean that displacement of
inefficient management became unimportant as a takeover motive. Even if "synergy" or
"bustup" became dominant explanations for more recent takeovers, such explanations of
"hostile" takeovers reflect value-increasing changes being made over the objection of intransigent
managers-a significant market discipline. This is supported by the more recent studies
discussed in GILSON & KRAAKMAN, supra.
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of shareholder voting rights"°° which, in light of shareholder passivity,
must be largely explicable in terms of the market for corporate
control.
Although the market for corporate control is important, exclusive
reliance on it to solve all of the potential conflicts of interest associated
with the separation of ownership and control is neither justified nor
necessary. Thus, it is not a substantial criticism of the contractual the-
ory of the corporation to argue that the market for control alone fails
to achieve perfect discipline."' Managerial discretion also is con-
strained by other market and legal mechanisms discussed elsewhere in
this Section, including monitoring by large owners and outside board
members. While the market for corporate control is therefore prop-
erly viewed as a last resort mechanism for correcting excessive mana-
gerial discretion, it is the persistent threat of displacement through
control transfers that is primarily responsible for reducing the likeli-
hood that shareholders will be harmed by their agents. 10 2 The market
for corporate control provides the glue that holds together the nexus
of contracts.
D. Corporate Hierarchy, the Board of Directors, and the Market for
Directors
A substantial body of influential theoretical work on corporate man-
agement recognizes the importance of the development in the 1920's of
the multi-divisional, or "M-form" of organization of large firms,
replacing the unitary, or "U-form" of organization."0 3 The M-form of
organization places responsibility for long-range planning and policy
in a separate group of managers from those responsible for day-to-day
operations, thus facilitating coherent overall planning for the entire
enterprise instead of factional war among subgroups. The overall
planning group includes the board of directors. Most importantly for
present purposes, the planning group provides internal monitoring of
100. For evidence that voting rights have market value, see Lease, McConnell & Mikkelson,
The Market Value of Control in Publicly-Traded Corporations, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 439 (1983). Also,
the mere fact that such voting rights have survived more than fifty years after Berle and Means
concluded they were meaningless is of some significance.
101. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
102. For a theory and data as to how the market for control fills gaps left by other monitoring
mechanisms, see MORCK, SHLEIFER & VISHNY, ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL (University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices Working Paper No.
228, 1988) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
103. See A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1962); 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note
79, at 132-54; 0. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 79, at 279-81.
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managers by efficiently separating decision management (the initiation
and implementation of strategic plans) and decision control (the ratifi-
cation and monitoring of the strategy formulation and implementation
process).04
The superior efficiency of the M-form of management for many
large firms has been empirically validated.105 There is also empirical
evidence indicating that independence of corporate boards can be
adjusted in order to improve financial performance, and that there is
in fact a systematic relationship between board composition and cor-
porate financial performance. 10 6
Some critics of the contract theory wholly ignore the role of the
management structure of the corporation in protecting against man-
agement misconduct.1"7 Professor Brudney, for example, minimizes
the role of this device when he echoes the often-expressed concern that
outside directors are passive pawns of managers and poor representa-
tives of shareholder interests10 8 and questions the effectiveness of mon-
itoring by non-director managers. 10 9 Brudney and other critics
effectively consign to the wastebasket the important work discussed
above on the evolution of corporate management forms.
E. Executive Compensation Contracts
Executive compensation is often structured in ways that attempt to
solve conflicts between investors and managers by aligning their inter-
ests, as through stock options, stock appreciation rights, phantom
stock and other mechanisms that tie compensation to market-based
performance.110 Moreover, incentives can be further aligned by
104. See Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 81, at 308.
105. Teece, Internal Organization and Economic Performance: An Empirical Analysis of the
Profitability of Principal Firms, 30 J. INDUS. ECON. 173 (1981).
106. Baysinger & Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance
Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101 (1985). Additional internal
monitoring to improve financial performance is provided by outside auditors. See Watts &
Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J. L. &
ECON. 613 (1983).
107. These structures are not mentioned in Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, who, as discussed
supra note 76, relies exclusively on the absence of "bonding"; nor are they mentioned in the
catalogue of market constraints on management conduct discussed by Eisenberg, supra note 9.
108. See Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1421, 1429; see also Brudney, The
Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982).
109. Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1430-31 n.72 (M-form of management
"is not without its problems" including "the problem of 'who watches the watchdogs' ").
110. See Diamond & Verrechia, Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security
Prices, 37 J. FIN. 275 (1982).
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rewarding managerial achievements through payments that constitute
a form of "ex post settling up."'1 1
Some critics of the contract theory have emphasized the evidence
uncovered by Jensen and Murphy112 of the significant disparity
between firm performance and the salary of chief executive officers.1 13
Even accepting Jensen and Murphy's data, there are, as noted above,
many other devices for aligning manager and investor incentives and
reducing the agency problem. Moreover, Jensen and Murphy specu-
late that the reason for the disparity between compensation and incen-
tive is that public corporations are not free to set optimal levels of
compensation in light of political and union pressures and SEC disclo-
sure rules. 14 Such pressures increase the need to provide optimal
levels of remuneration by means of the kinds of implicit compensation
(such as permitting executives to take advantage of "corporate"
opportunities) that could be permitted by contracts opting out of fidu-
ciary duties. Thus, the evidence on the compensation issue may point
to less regulation of the corporate contract, not more as Coffee argues.
F Markets for Managers
Corporate managers recognize that they can improve the perform-
ance of the firm by reducing agency costs. Managers compete with
one another to attain the top positions in their companies, and most
promotion decisions are made on the basis of an individual's produc-
tivity. Shareholders benefit as managers attempt to climb the corpo-
rate ladder by improving their productivity and impressing their
superiors. Moreover, top level managers often increase their salaries
by jumping to other firms or threatening to do so. Thus, competition
for managerial services, both inside and outside the corporation,
encourages managers to act in shareholders' best interests.' 5
111. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 296 (1980).
112. JENSEN & MURPHY, ARE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CONTRACTS STRUCTURED
PROPERLY? (University of Rochester Managerial Economic Research Center Working Paper,
1987) (on file with Washington Law Review).
113. See Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 943-44; Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1490. Professor
Coffee, in particular, relies almost exclusively on the Jensen-Murphy study as evidence that
contractual constraints on management do not work.
114. JENSEN & MURPHY, supra note 112; Professor Jensen contends that incentive
compensation in "LBO Associations" is one response to this problem. See Jensen, Eclipse, supra
note 88, at 68-69.
115. See Faith, Higgins & Tollison, Managerial Rents and Outside Recruitment in the
Coasian Firm, 74 ECON. REV. 60 (1984). Once again, critics of the contract theory complain
that this device does not operate perfectly. Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1495, argues that the chief
executive officer is not disciplined by the market for managers because he is in his final period,
and other managers are chiefly concerned with satisfying the chief executive. Neither assumption
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G. Ownership Structure
Ownership structure recently has' been identified as playing an
important role in the governance of corporations.' 16 In contrast to the
convention of viewing the governance role of residual claimants as
that of being "rationally ignorant" of the firm's internal affairs and
exiting the firm upon dissatisfaction, some owners of large blocks of
shares may have so much of their wealth tied up in a firm that they
cannot afford to ignore the governance of the corporation. Monitor-
ing, or the possibility of monitoring, by large shareholders alters man-
agerial behavior and reduces agency costs. Thus, ownership structure
is another of the many corpofate governance mechanisms that can be
utilized in controlling agency costs. 117 Of course, in many corpora-
tions, the ownership structure is so diffuse that shareholders are truly
rationally ignorant, in which case the other governance mechanisms
become relatively more important.
H. Fiduciary Duties: Mandatory Rules Versus Freedom of Contract
An mportant aspect of the contract theory of the corporation, and
one that is hotly disputed by the anti-contractarians, is that fiduciary
duties are a term of the corporate contract and therefore consensual in
nature. 118
The, role of fiduciary duties must be understood in the context of
contracting problems in long-term contracts. In contracts calling for
acts over an extended period by the contracting party, it is costly to
anticipate and draft for every contingency. This is the condition of
"bounded rationality.""' 9  As Oliver Williamson has said,
"[c]omprehensive contracting is not a realistic organizational alterna-
tive when provision for bounded rationality is made. If mind is a
scarce resource, then economizing on claims against it is plainly war-
ranted."' 120 Where the benefits (including certainty) of specifying
is supported by theory or data. In all events, as discussed supra notes 76-78, it is essential to
consider the entire universe of mutually complementary market and contract constraints rather
than each separately. For example, the market for control can discipline even some managers
who are in their final period.
116. See generally Baysinger & Butler, supra note 106; Demsetz & Lehn, The Structure of
Corporate Ownership. Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985).
117. Professor Eisenberg complains that this device alone does not completely constrain
managers. See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1493-95. Once again, the relevant question is whether
the universe of devices, and not each separately, is effective. See supra notes 76-78.
118. See Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, supra note
3, at 180 n.30.
119. This term originated in H. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198 (1957).
120. 0. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 79, at 46 (citations omitted).
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duties are significant and the costs are relatively low, a fully contingent
contract-that is, one in which the parties' acts under all contingen-
cies are specified-may result. Where these conditions do not obtain,
the parties may seek other alternatives, including relational or govern-
ance-type contracts that constrain the parties to act for their mutual
benefit. 121
Constraints on the parties in relational contracts may take a variety
of forms. One alternative is to rely on implied terms, including good
faith performance and fiduciary duties. 2 2 These are legally enforcea-
ble standard-form provisions that reduce transaction costs by making
it unnecessary for the parties to draft for remote contingencies.
Another alternative is to forego legally enforceable duties in favor of
the kinds of market constraints discussed elsewhere in this Section.
The critical point to understand under the contract theory is that
fiduciary duties are not distinct from the contract but are simply one
of many drafting alternatives. 123 That is so despite the fact that fiduci-
ary duties are imposed on parties who have not drafted around them.
Professor Brudney has argued that the fact that the duties are imposed
without bargaining indicates that they are mandatory.' 24 But it is
irrelevant that the terms invented by courts, like suits manufactured
for potential consumers, are not the product of a bargaining process
and may even be contrary to what particular parties would want. If
the parties can choose the terms by either accepting them or con-
tracting around them, the result of this choice is a contract. Thus, the
question is not how the terms are articulated, but how they apply to
the parties.
In selecting between fiduciary duties and alternative constraints, the
parties consider both the costs and benefits of fiduciary duties, and at
the margin trade off fiduciary duties for other constraints. On the ben-
efit side, it is relevant that the other contractual and market devices
discussed in this Section do not operate perfectly. Thus, the parties to
corporate contracts may conclude that a judicial remedy is necessary
to fill in the gap left by extra-judicial remedies. But the parties also
may conclude that the costs of fiduciary duties outweigh their
gap-filling benefits. Among other things, fiduciary duties shift risk to
121. See supra Section III(A)-(G).
122. See Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARV. L. REV. 369, 371 (1980); Goetz & Scott, supra note 80, at 1092-93.
123. For a discussion of the similar problem of distinguishing between the CONTRACTUAL
duty of good faith and AVOIDANCE of the contract on unconscionability grounds, see Burton,
supra note 122, at 371-72.
124. Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1427 n.60.
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managers, who are poor risk-bearers, and expose the corporation to
costly litigation. 125 Just as there are imperfect extra-judicial remedies,
there are also imperfect judicial remedies. Thus, it is a fallacy to
assume that merely because fiduciary duties and remedies are part of
the contract in some cases that they are always so, and that sharehold-
ers should not be able to opt out of these duties.
That fiduciary duties are part of the contracting process can be seen
from their close relationship with explicit contract terms. Because the
parties usually cannot and do not specify the entire contract in their
promise, the promise is only a "fragment" of the entire understanding
between the parties. 126 Discerning the unarticulated portions of an
actual agreement may closely resemble the process of making up a
contract for the parties that is involved in the recognition of fiduciary
duties. 127
It is sometimes difficult but always necessary to distinguish between
interpreting and imposing contract terms. 128  Despite the costs
entailed in drafting for all contingencies, the court should not always
assume that the parties have adopted the default fiduciary duty term,
and should not apply fiduciary duties if the parties have opted out of
them. 129
125. For discussions of the costs of fiduciary duties, see infra Section V(A); Davis, Judicial
Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 27-29
(1985); Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law.
A Theoretical and EmpiricalAnalysis, 71 CORN. L. REv. 261, 262-63 (1986); Ribstein, Takeover
Defenses, supra note 3
126. See Macneil, Many Futures, supra note 56, at 734.
127. For example, it may be difficult to distinguish between resolution of bondholder rights
issues on the basis of fiduciary duties or broad interpretation of the indenture. See Bratton, supra
note 56, at 695, 738.
128. For a discussion of this problem in the context of takeover defensive moves, see Ribstein,
Takeover Defenses, supra note 3, at 105-06.
129. The problem is similar to adding an "omitted term" to a contract. The court must first
interpret the contract to determine whether anything was omitted., If there is an omitted term,
the court supplies a term that is fair in the circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 204 (1979); Farnsworth, Disputes over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REv.
860 (1968); Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 CORN. L.
REv. 785 (1982).
This is illustrated by Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), cert denied,
108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988). Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, held that Duff & Phelps
may have had an implied fiduciary duty to disclose an impending merger to a shareholder-
employee who was planning to quit, and who on resignation had an obligation to sell his stock to
the company at book value. Judge Posner, dissenting, held that such a duty was precluded as a
matter of law because the express terms of the contract did not provide for it. Judge Easterbrook
seems to have leaned toward an anti-contractarian application of the hypothetical bargain
approach. (For the distinction between the hypothetical bargain approach and the contract
theory of the corporation, see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.) Judge Posner, on the
other hand, appears to have recognized that if the parties may be fairly interpreted to have opted
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Professor Coffee, on the other hand, argues that the courts should
adopt a general fiduciary duty as a "canon of construction" of corpo-
rate statutes and charters in all cases where they are not clear.13°
Armed with this "canon of construction," the court could decide if it
should enforce charter provisions whether or not they are consistent
with the statute. As should be evident from the above discussion, this
approach trumps private contracts, thereby nullifying the parties' sen-
sitive balancing of costs and benefits of fiduciary duties.
Coffee justifies his mandatory rule in part on the ground that courts
should interpret statutes as "public regarding" unless they explicitly
reflect an interest group deal. 131 In this context, according to Coffee,
"public regarding" means that the court "should posit that a basic
purpose of corporate law is to reduce agency costs."' 3 2 But Coffee
does not explain why the "public regarding" purpose of the statute is
not to effectuate private contracts among the parties to the corporation
(as distinguished from deals with legislators) or to fill blanks with effi-
cient hypothetical bargains,1 33 rather than to mandatorily reduce
agency costs whatever the offsetting costs to the parties of doing so.
Ultimately, therefore, Coffee's justification for mandatory rules
depends on underlying policy factors, particularly including whether
out of fiduciary duties, the court must respect the parties' contract even if such duties appear to
be consistent with the court's view of the optimal "hypothetical bargain." Professor Coffee
mistakenly concludes that both Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner applied the hypothetical
bargain approach, and that therefore Jordan illustrates the indeterminacy of this approach.
Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling, supra note 9, at 1680-81. In fact, only Judge Easterbrook applied
this approach, while Judge Posner applied the parties' actual contract.
The courts generally have been more willing to apply express terms of bondholder contracts
than of shareholder contracts. See, e.g., Kirschner Bros. Oil, Inc. v. Natomas Co., 185 Cal. App.
3d 784, 229 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1986) (preferred shareholders); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del.
1988) (debt holders); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
(debt holders); Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group Inc., 474 A.2d 133 (Del. 1984) (preferred
stockholders); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974) (dismissing complaint by
bondholders on fraud and fiduciary duty theories), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 347 A.2d 133 (Del.
1975) (reversing dismissal of fraud allegations). For other cases in which the courts have refused
to read fiduciary duties into the contract in the face of explicit terms, see In re Reading Co., 711
F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1983) (contract that provided for charging of nonprofit-maximizing rates to
shareholders that operated the company's railroad cars precluded action for self-dealing);
Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981) (contract that permitted the company to
repurchase plaintiff-employee's stock when he was terminated altered the defendants' fiduciary
duty to refrain from freezeout mergers).
130. See Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling, supra note 9, at 1685.
131. The "public regarding" approach is borrowed from Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223
(1986).
132. Coffee, Mandatory Enabling, supra note 9, at 1685.
133. See Ribstein, Takeover Defenses, supra note 3, at 122.
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contract provisions are adequately constrained by markets, rather
than on principles of statutory construction.
The above discussion demonstrates that characterizing an issue as
one of fiduciary duty does not automatically remove it from the realm
of private ordering. 34 While the question is ultimately one of policy,
the fundamentally contractual nature of fiduciary duties means that
they should be subject to the same presumption in favor of private
ordering that applies to other contracts.
I Conclusion
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that, contrary to the skepti-
cism of critics of the contract theory, numerous aspects of the corpo-
rate contract, from choice of organizational form to specific aspects of
these forms to corporate law provisions, address and alleviate the risk
of managerial misconduct. Indeed, many of the variations between
contractual forms can be explained only as ways of optimizing the
costs and benefits of dealing through agents in particular situations.
This indicates that the corporate contract is robust rather than being
so one-sided that it needs a regulatory prop.
A central problem with the anti-contractarian criticisms of the cor-
porate contract is that they often view elements of this contract, such
as executive compensation, in isolation, concluding from the fact that
one element leaves gaps in protection that shareholders are unpro-
tected. In fact, the corporate contract must be viewed as a whole, with
each of the elements reinforcing and closing gaps left by other ele-
ments. For example, internal monitoring by independent directors
and auditors may not be wholly effective, but they do not have to be in
the light of, for example, the market for corporate control.
The view of the corporate relationship presented in this Section
should at least establish a presumption in favor of private ordering in
the corporation in general and opt-out provisions in particular. As
discussed in Section IV, the apparent efficiency of the contract terms is
borne out by the efficiency of the capital markets which drives pricing
of the terms of corporate contracts.
134. That is not to say that opting out of fiduciary duties should always be permitted under a
private ordering regime. As discussed in Section VII, infra, there are important issues
concerning whether opting out of fiduciary duties is a violation of the parties' existing agreement.
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IV. THE ADEQUACY OF MARKET CONSTRAINTS ON
CONTRACT TERMS
Opponents of private ordering argue that the terms of the corporate
contract are priced in a "lemons market"' 35 in which there are inade-
quate incentives to offer optimal protection against managerial mis-
conduct. 36 That is, these critics assert that there is a market failure in
the ability of securities markets to accurately evaluate firm-specific
corporate governance information, including the risk of managerial
shirking or diversion inherent in certain contracts. The important
implication of the market's failure to accurately price contract terms is
that such terms are suboptimal, and resources are not allocated to
their highest value uses. 137 Because of the importance of this argu-
ment to the regulatory approach to managerial duties, it is crucial to
consider whether it has any validity.
Unlike most areas of legal discourse, where it is unlikely that the
correct answer can be "proven," the incorrect application of econom-
ics can be demonstrated. The market failure argument, which is an
economics argument, contains numerous fatal flaws. Most impor-
tantly, the argument is based on a misapprehension of the workings of
efficient capital markets. A thorough understanding of the Efficient
Capital Markets Hypothesis reveals that securities markets are effi-
cient in the sense that a corporate shareholder gets what he is paying
for in both the terms of the contract and the substantive nature of the
product, including the quality of management. The ramifications of
this powerful fact will be explored throughout this Section, as we
demonstrate the fallacy of the market-based arguments of critics of
private ordering.
Most of this Section considers market constraints on contract terms
applicable to investors purchasing shares after the terms have been set.
However, Section IV(F) discusses application of "midstream" amend-
ments to investors as of the time of the amendment. Despite the con-
cerns raised by some critics of the contract theory, no special problems
are raised by this situation.
135. See Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the -Market Mechanism,
84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
136. See Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 947, 948.
137. Professor Eisenberg argues that certain terms that are "surprising" should be
unenforceable even if they are accurately priced. Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1519. If the
provisions are "surprising," it seems to follow that they are not accurately priced. If the
provisions are accurately priced even though surprising, it is unclear what policy could justify
non-enforcement.
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A. Efficient Capital Markets and Corporate Governance Contracts
There is substantial evidence favoring the general efficiency of the
securities markets. 3 ' Prices of actively traded securities 139 quickly
reflect at least all public information about a company.14°
The basic mechanism of market efficiency is that information about
a firm continually alters investor expectations about future returns,
and hence the prices at which they will sell and buy their securities.14
138. Professor Michael Jensen, a leading efficient market theorist, has said that "there is no
other proposition in economics which has more... empirical evidence supporting it than the
efficient market hypothesis." Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6
J. FIN. ECON. 95, 95 (1978). There has been some criticism of the evidence supporting market
efficiency-particularly in relation to allocative efficiency (relating to the value of firms as a
whole) as distinguished from speculative efficiency (relating to the value of securities divorced
from the assets they represent). For summaries of criticism of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis, see Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities
Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761 (1985); Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The
Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 891,
898-900 (1988); Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J.
FIN. 591 (1986); Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAvIs
L. REv. 341 (1986). Nevertheless, as suggested by the Jensen quote, the Efficient Capital
Markets Hypothesis remains by far the dominant view of the securities markets among financial
economists.
139. This does not, of course, apply to close corporations. However, the participants in
closely held firms contract with each other directly, and so do not need the protection of the
securities markets as a constraint on the development of efficient arrangenents. That is not to
say that fiduciary duties are irrelevant, or even less relevant, in closely held than in publicly held
firms, but only that the absence of an efficient securities market in shares of closely held firms
does not present a problem with respect to contracting around such duties. As to the differences
between close and public corporations, see Manne, supra note 81, at 276-84.
Despite the existence of face-to-face dealings in the close corporation, Professor Eisenberg
claims that there is a need for some mandatory duties even in this context because the parties do
not give their full attention to long term consequences or fully appreciate the implications of
provisions dealing with such consequences. Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1469-70. This simply
restates the "bounded rationality" problem, and ignores the existence of contractual devices for
dealing with it. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. Among other things, the
"bounded rationality" problem may cause the parties to a closely held firm to rely on statutory or
common law default provisions. See Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65
WASH. U.L.Q. 357, 410-14 (1987). But this problem does not justify trumping private
agreements. Indeed, if anything, refusal to enforce such arrangements increases the difficulty of
planning.
140. It is commonly accepted that there are degrees of market efficiency depending on the
nature of the information. The "strong form" of the theory holds that market value reflects all
relevant information; the "semi-strong" that market value reflects all public infisrmation; and the
"weak form" that market prices move in relation to information rather than according to
established patterns of price movement. See Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21
FIN. ANAL. J. 55 (1965).
141. Thus, there is substantial evidence that, because of high cross-elasticity of demand over
the market for all securities, stock prices do not respond merely to the quantity being sold. See
Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of
Information on Share Prices, 45 J. BUS. 179 (1972).
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This information reaches investors in a wide variety of ways, including
voluntary and mandatory public disclosures by firms, stories in the
financial media, reports by securities analysts and disclosures of
insider trades.' 42 Even information that is not disclosed may be antici-
patorily reflected to some extent in market prices through trades by
many uninformed investors. 4 '
The information efficiently reflected in market prices includes the
terms of contracts constraining managerial discretion and the pros-
pects that this discretion will be exercised consistently with investor
interests.' 44 Any change in these contracts, and any change in or new
information about the managers of such a corporation, such as their
track records, reputations and the like, will be reported in the financial
media. Through the mechanisms of market efficiency, this informa-
tion is reflected in market price. And because information about con-
tract terms and managers is accurately reflected in market price,
investors get what they pay for, and capital is allocated to the most
efficient firms.
Finally, it should be noted that even if the anti-contractarians could
produce evidence of market inefficiency, this would not necessarily
weaken the argument in support of enforcement of corporate con-
tracts. For example, one of the principal arguments against market
efficiency is that securities prices do not accurately reflect all available
information because they also reflect "noise," or biases of uninformed
traders.' 45 But even in a generally "noisy" market, "real" informa-
tion, including information about the contract terms constraining
managers, continues to affect stock prices. While it may be impossible
to fully disentangle the effects of "noise" from those of underlying
facts, this does not mean that a contract that ignores investor interests
will go unpunished in the market. Interestingly, critics of private
ordering do not rest their arguments for regulation of the corporate
contract on assertions of general market inefficiency.146
142. For a discussion of the interrelation of methods of disclosure and degrees of market
efficiency, see Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REy. 549
(1984).
143. See Verrechia, On the Theory of Market Information Efficiency, I J. AccT. & EcON. 77
(1979).
144. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 16-17.
145. See Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986).
146. See Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1422-26 (accepting efficiency of
stock markets); Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 941-42 (accurate pricing of securities does not
eliminate potential for unfairness).
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B. Unsafe at Any Price? The Anti-Contractarians' Arguments
Against Effectiveness of Market Constraints
Critics of private ordering argue that general market efficiency does
not sufficiently protect investors from the risk of managerial miscon-
duct to eliminate the need for regulation. As we demonstrate in this
Section, these arguments reveal serious misunderstandings concerning
the operation of financial markets.
L Market Prices Do Not Reflect Expected Agency Costs
Critics of private ordering assert that there is a problem of "infor-
mational asymmetry" preventing information concerning agency
problems from being fully reflected in market prices.147 The basic
argument is that managers and other insiders always have better infor-
mation than shareholders, not only about the corporation's financial
prospects, but also about the likelihood that managers themselves will
engage in disloyalty, shirking or other forms of discretionary behavior
that harms shareholders.
Professor James Cox says, "managers know the frequency and
amount of harm caused by their misconduct, whereas outside inves-
tors do not." '148 Similarly, Professor Coffee asserts that firms cannot
distinguish themselves regarding expected agency cost, which permits
defalcating managers to impose costs on better firms, resulting "in an
unnecessary and socially inefficient increase in the average cost of cap-
ital experienced by all firms. In short, there is an externality."' 14 9 As a
result, according to Coffee, investors will overinvest in poorly man-
aged firms, and the quality of management and of corporate contracts
will regress to the mean, as in any "lemons" market. 5 0 This is a sig-
nificant point because, if correct and the costs are large enough to be
147. See Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1423-24; see also Cox,
Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundariesfor Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. Rav. 745, 747-48 (1984) (asserting that there is an "informational asymmetry"
problem, but then pointing out that this problem may be addressed by signaling by firms, and not
discussing why signaling does not fully address the "informational asymmetry" problem).
148. Cox, supra note 147, at 747.
149. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 946; see also, to the same effect, Cox, supra note 147, at
752. Coffee's assumption that the lemons phenomenon results in a higher average cost of capital
for all firms is revealing. There are winners and losers for this market imperfection, if it exists.
Thus, some firms would take advantage of the information asymmetry to lower their cost of
capital below what itwould be if all information about managerial behavior were reflected in the
price. A more charitable assumption is that Coffee means the weighted average cost of capital
increases because more firms are losers than are winners as a result of the information
asymmetry. This would be plausible but for the fact that the losers can engage in activities
designed to convince investors of their integrity.
150. See Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 947, 948.
36
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relevant, it justifies imposing fiduciary duties and derivative remedies
even on firms that have reasonably concluded that, for them, the bur-
den of such remedies outweighs their benefit. 151
The "externality" argument fails on several counts. First, Professor
Coffee fails to distinguish relevant and irrelevant externalities. 1 52 The
externalities identified by Coffee are most likely irrelevant to an effi-
ciency analysis (which is his mode of analysis at this point) because
they are solely pecuniary; they may change prices, but prices still sat-
isfy the efficiency condition of being equal to marginal costs. Thus,
Coffee appears to commit the often-observed non-sequitur of saying,
"It's an externality, therefore, we better have a law." This is not only
logically wrong, but it ignores the costs of the law.
A second problem with the "externality" analysis is that the critics
of private ordering have given no reason why the market cannot cope
with information about expected agency costs.' 53 Even Professor Cof-
fee has pointed out 15 4 that the extent of investor uncertainty (which
surely varies across firms) will be reflected in the market price of the
stock. Thus, there is no reason why market prices, if they reflect other
information (such as constantly changing prospects of a merger), can-
not also reflect such matters as the impact of different compensation
arrangements, the effect on agency costs of different capital struc-
tures, 1 55 and the quality of management.
Nor is there a valid basis for distinguishing between charter provi-
sions that generally opt out of fiduciary duties and those that opt out
of liability for specific conduct. 56 Both types of provisions leave
uncertainty as to what kind of conduct managers will engage in.
Indeed, the market may have an easier time predicting the conduct of
151. Thus, the externality argument is used to justify derivative remedy in PRINCIPLES, supra
note 6, at 13-14 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1989). Professor Coffee is Reporter for this Part of the
A.L.I. project. See supra note 9.
152. For an excellent discussion of this distinction in the corporate law context, see Haddock,
Macey & McChesney, supra note 3, at 723-726.
153. Professor Brudney does, in a discussion of whether investors are aware of corporate law
changes (see infra Section IV(B)(4)) refer to literature on heuristics that suggests that people tend
to be overoptimistic in predicting outcomes. Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at
1418 n.35. But nothing in this literature makes the wholly counterintuitive suggestion that
investors (including the professional analysts and financial journalists who play a large role in
determining share prices) will generally be overly sanguine about the honesty and dedication of
corporate managers.
154. See Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 942.
155. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (concerning the reduction-of-agency-cost
explanation of premia in leveraged buyouts).
156. See Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling, supra note 9, at 1664-65, 1667-71 (advocating such a
distinction).
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an established manager under a general provision than that of a shift-
ing cast of characters under a specific provision. In all events, the
market may have even greater difficulty pricing potentially costly fidu-
ciary duties than it does pricing opt-out provisions.
A third problem with the externality argument is that it ignores the
fact that a substantial portion of the supposedly "external" costs fall
on precisely those who can ameliorate the problem. 157 Honest manag-
ers do not sit idly by as dishonest managers of other firms impose costs
on them. If investors receive a return based on an unfounded expecta-
tion that managers will engage in cheating, or on uncertainty as to
whether they will or not, then either they will reap a windfall at the
expense of managers who are not cheating up to expectations, or man-
agers who would otherwise be honest will cheat in order to prevent
this windfall. It is reasonable to expect that "honest" managers will
attempt to capture the benefit of this investor windfall for themselves.
Managers can develop a reputation for honesty,158 employ devices for
signalling this honesty, 59 institute internal monitoring through
outside directors or auditors,"6 bond the payout of future cash flows
by substituting equity for debt,1 61 or institute any of the other devices
for control of agency costs discussed in Section III. The presence or
absence of these devices would be reflected in the market price of the
firm's securities. If shareholders are willing to pay (in the form of a
lower return) for these assurances, there is no reason why the manag-
ers should not be able to share in this payment in the form of, for
157. In other words, because there is a bargaining interface between investors and managers,
managers cannot shift the costs of their mismanagement to investors as, for example, a polluting
factory might be able to shift the costs of pollution to its neighbors. See Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
158. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 3, at 781-88.
159. See Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of Modern Finance
Theory and Signaling Theory in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177 (Edwards ed. 1979).
Interestingly, the "informational asymmetries" discussed at notes 147-51, supra, actually work
in favor of private ordering since investors' knowledge of these asymmetries should facilitate
signaling by making the signals more credible.
Professor Coffee ignores these devices when he asserts the "managements can seldom convey
assurances to investors that the latter deem reliable that the former will not engage in
opportunistic self-dealing," Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 947, and that the "managerial cast is
constantly changing and publicly disclosed information provides little basis for assessment," id.
at 945. Moreover, Coffee gives no evidence to support his assertion about the "constantly
changing" managerial cast.
The use of resources to signal quality is not, as Professor Coffee argues, "unfairness" or a
misallocation of resources worthy of government intervention, Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at
946, but rather a private cost that firms decide to bear when they adopt the public corporation
form of organization.
160. See supra notes 103-106.
161. See Jensen, Agency Costs, supra note 88; Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 88, at 67.
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example, higher salary. Moreover, failure to employ these devices
increases the firm's cost of capital and makes it an attractive takeover
target. In short, competitive markets will not tolerate honest manag-
ers' being content to pay investors ex ante for cheating the managers
will not be doing.
The "externalities" argument is so weak that Professor Coffee him-
self eventually backs away from it. He notes that investors will price
companies that opt out of fiduciary duties lower than those that do
not, so that "the 'lemons market' effect [of opting out] should be lim-
ited to those firms that do opt out." '162 If the market can discern dif-
ferences between firms that opt out and those that do not, then it must
also be able to price other differences between firms, such as particu-
larly reputable managers or strong monitoring procedures.
2. How Expected Agency Costs Affect Stock Prices: Agency Cost as
Systematic Risk
Some critics of the contract theory question not only whether
agency costs and related matters are reflected in stock prices, but how
this occurs. Specifically, they claim that agency cost is systematic
rather than firm-specific risk.163 Before discussing and evaluating this
important misconception in the anti-contractarian literature, it is nec-
essary to review some basic principles of corporate finance.
The price of a security reflects the net present value of the stream of
real cash flows that the firm. is expected to generate. Because the
future is not certain, expectations about the future cash flows are
expressed in terms of a probability distribution-mean and standard
deviation. The price of a security depends both on the mean of
expected cash flows and on the range over which expected cash flows
are dispersed, the latter factor being generally referred to as "vari-
ance," which is the way financial analysts define risk. Since investors
are assumed to be risk averse, two securities with identical mean
expected cash flows will be priced differently if the variance of the
expected cash flows of one security is greater than the variance of the
other. 164 At the market price, each security will receive a normal, or
market, rate of return adjusted for the underlying risk of the cash
flows.
162. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 949.
163. See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., W. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS 119-22 (2d ed. 1981).
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In understanding market valuation of securities, it is important to
recognize that investors can reduce variance, or risk, by holding diver-
sified portfolios-that is, collections of assets the risks of which are to
some extent complementary. For example, the portfolio risk of two
firms, one of which makes swimsuits and the other which makes
umbrellas, will be less than the risk of each firm separately, because
expected portfolio returns are not dispersed as widely by uncertainty
regarding the weather as are the expected returns of each separate
firm. However, some risks, such as macroeconomic events like infla-
tion or general recession, inevitably will affect all risky assets; they
cannot be "diversified away." The Capital Assets Pricing Model, the
dominant theory of financial valuation, states that the market price of
securities will reflect "systematic," or market-wide, risk (commonly
referred to as the stock's "beta"), which cannot be eliminated by diver-
sification, but not "firm-specific" risk, which can be eliminated by
holding diversifiedportfolios of assets.16
Investor expectations concerning managerial misconduct can affect
both the mean and the variance of a security. If, for example, the firm
is taken over by a known looter and there are no significant controls in
place, investor expectations concerning mean net cash flows will plum-
met. Risk also may increase because the range of possibilities now
includes loss of the shareholders' investments. Stock prices will fall to
reflect the lowered expectations and higher risk. At the new price,
new investors in the revalued shares will receive a normal rate of
return ex ante. If someone with an unusually good reputation takes
over, or controls over misconduct are tightened (such as by the addi-
tion of outside board members), mean earnings expectations may
increase and variance may decrease. To take an example that is par-
ticularly relevant to the present discussion, if the shareholders decide
to opt out of all fiduciary duties, investors may conclude that this will
sufficiently reduce managers' incentives to act in the shareholders'
interests; that mean earnings can be expected to fall; and that, with the
constraints on management misconduct loosened, the variance of pos-
sible outcomes-that is, risk-has increased. 166 The lower expected
earnings will result in lower share prices.
165. See, eg., R. BREALEY & S. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 132-33 (3d
ed. 1988).
166. Alternatively, investors may conclude that mean expected earnings will rise now that the
company no longer needs to contend with wasteful derivative litigation and managers are freer to
exercise their business judgment.
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One further important point should be made about the effect of
expected agency costs on stock prices. To the extent that these expec-
tations affect risk, the risk is specific to a particular firm and is there-
fore not reflected in market price under the Capital Assets Pricing
Model. This necessarily follows from the fact that agency costs are a
function of the unique management and contractual setting of a spe-
cific firm. No market-wide, systematic factor is at work (short of, for
example, a universal change in human nature). It follows that the risk
can be eliminated by holding a diversified portfolio of securities, that
investors are not compensated for bearing the risk, and that share
prices accordingly do not reflect this risk.167
All of this would be remarkable and noncontroversial but for Pro-
fessor Coffee's assertion that "the assumption that the market evalu-
ates the risk of fiduciary abuse on a firm specific basis needs re-
examination." '68 Coffee concludes that the risk of fiduciary miscon-
duct is systematic because "[o]nly those firms (notably few, I believe)
that can credibly distinguish themselves from the herd through signal-
ing, monitoring, or bonding will be separately and individually
'priced.' 
"169
Coffee's argument confuses the distinction between systematic and
firm-specific risk with the question of whether variations among firms
in mean expected returns are reflected in security prices. As discussed
above,' 70 because the efficient securities markets can distinguish
among firms in terms of potential agency costs, stock prices reflect
these costs. 17 ' Even if critics of private ordering are correct in disput-
ing market efficiency in this respect, there is still no correlation in the
167. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, supra note 70, at 711-14.
168. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 945. Along similar lines, some writers have correctly
noted the difficulty of constructing a portfolio that completely diversifies away agency cost. See
Cox, supra note 147, at 748-52; Gordon, supra note 9, at 1595-96. These writers fail to make the
critical comparison between the costs of portfolio diversification and of incomplete
diversification, and the costs of fiduciary duties remedies.
Professor Cox also argues that portfolio diversification does not address the problems of the
nondiversifying investor. Cox, supra note 147, at 752. This ignores the enormous percentage of
investing that is done through institutions and mutual funds, thereby predicating general
mandatory rules on exceptional fact situations.
169. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 945. If the risk were indeed systematic, it would be
reflected in the prices of all securities. Indeed, this is consistent with Coffee's point, discussed
supra note 149, that agency costs raise the cost of capital for all firms. However, systematic risk
does not impact on all firms identically; the impact depends on the stock's "beta," or sensitivity
to market risk.
170. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
171. Since the price investors pay for their securities reflects any expected reduction in
returns resulting from managerial misconduct, the shareholders earn a normal rate of return.
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occurrence of managerial and agency problems across firms. It fol-
lows that, to the extent that these problems affect risk, the risk is firm-
specific and not systematic. In short, the anti-contractarians do not
enhance their criticism of market efficiency by recasting it in terms of
the Capital Assets Pricing Model.
3. Ignorance of Individual Investors
Some anti-contractarian writers argue that corporate contracts
should not necessarily be enforced because individual investors are
ignorant concerning the corporate governance arrangements they vote
on or invest in. 172 The average investor is, indeed, "rationally igno-
rant" of such matters. 173  But this ignorance is of no importance
regarding investment decisions as long as the efficient market operates
to discount information concerning expected agency costs into securi-
ties prices.1 74
The assumption that individual shareholder understanding of and
assent to corporate terms is necessary to legitimate corporate contract
terms has engendered the mistaken idea that corporate charter provi-
sions that opt out of fiduciary duties should be periodically resubmit-
ted for shareholder vote.1 75  In light of efficient market pricing of
contract terms, such repeated votes are unnecessary.176
4. Investor Ignorance of Implied Legal Duties
It has been argued against the contract theory that investors gener-
ally are not aware at any particular time of the constantly changing
law regarding managerial duties. 177 Of course, as discussed above in
this Section, the ignorance of individual investors would not be signifi-
cant if, with the help of market professionals, information about
implied duties were efficiently reflected in share prices. But one study
suggests that this may not always be the case. This study found no
172. Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 1836; Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at
1414-20; Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1477-80 n.*.
173. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
174. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 17-18.
175. Such repeated votes are required under PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 5.09 (Tent. Draft
No. 7, 1987) to effectuate "standards of the corporation" that authorize interested transactions.
176. Moreover, even if the terms were not efficiently priced and some investors were ignorant
of them when they bought in, it is not clear why anti-contractarians would conclude that
repeated voting solves the problem in light of their criticisms of the efficacy of shareholder
voting. See infra notes 211-217 and accompanying text.
177. See Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1414-20.
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evidence of abnormal returns in a study of market price reaction to
several significant Delaware supreme court cases.' 78
There are problems with the Weiss and White data. First, at least
some of the cases selected may not have had the significant unantici-
pated effect on Delaware law claimed by Weiss and White. For exam-
ple, in Zapata v. Maldonado, 179 the court adopted a middle-of-the-
road position on the power of special litigation committees that might
have been anticipated from prior cases. 80 Second, in light of the huge
percentage of publicly traded corporations that are incorporated in
Delaware, and the substantial influence of Delaware courts on other
states' courts, it is questionable whether any study could accurately
determine whether "abnormal" returns resulted from Delaware law
changes applicable to all Delaware corporations.
Nevertheless, Weiss and White's conclusion about the effect of case
law changes on stock prices should not be completely dismissed.
Because of the uncertainty inherent in judicial decisions on fiduciary
duties, case law changes are much more difficult for the market to
assess than other governance changes. Indeed, this is one of the most
important problems with broad fiduciary duties that delegate substan-
tial power over corporate governance to the courts.18' But the policy
implication is consistent with the contract theory: The parties should
be able to opt out of fiduciary duties to avoid costly
unpredictability. '82
178. Weiss & White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Investor' Reactions to
"Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 551 (1987). Weiss and White were forced to
omit Van Gorkum because the supreme court opinion in that case was issued the same day as the
chancery court opinion in Moran. Id. at 568. For a study finding that the Van Gorkum case had
no effect on the market value of Delaware corporations, but that the passage of 8 Del. Code
§ 102(b)(7) (the so-called "anti-Van Gorkum" provision) had a negative effect, see Bradley &
Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, An Analysis of
the Trans Union Decision and Subsequent Delaware Legislation, to be published in 75 IOWA L.
REV. - (1990).
179. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
180. For a critique of Bradley & Schipani, supra note 178, primarily on the ground of the
indeterminate effect of Van Gorkum, see GILSON & KRAAKMAN, supra note 99, at 10-23.
181. See Ribstein, supra note 3.
182. Weiss and White and other anti-contractarians have argued that the lack of price effects
from case law changes show that governance provisions generally ar not reflected in stock price.
See Weiss & White, supra note 178, at 589-90; Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1502, 1508; Fox, The
Role of the Market Model in Corporate Law Analysis: A Comment on Weiss & White, 76 CALIF.
L. REV. 1015, 1041-43 (1988). This is an unwarranted conclusion. First, as discussed
immediately above, there is a significant difference between case law and other types of
governance changes. Second, there is voluminous data showing changes resulting from such
changes as (1) poison pills, Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth,
20 J. FIN. ECON. 377 (1988); (2) shark repellents, DeAngelo & Rice, Antitakeover Charter
Amendments and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. FIN. EcON. 329 (1983); Linn & McConnell, An
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In conclusion, because expected agency costs and corporate con-
tracts constraining them are reflected in the prices investors pay for
securities, there are no corporate-governance externalities. In the
absence of such a market failure, there is no efficiency justification on
which to base mandatory rules.
C. Optimal Versus Complete Discipline of Managers
Anti-contractarians attempt to make a case for regulation evenin
the face of efficient market pricing. They assert that managers are not
disciplined by incentive compensation packages or other types of mon-
itoring and bonding devices. Thus, Professor Coffee says:
[A] stock price can be "accurate" in the sense that the price accurately
measures the range of this uncertainty [of management misdealing], but
a potential for unfairness can remain because of the substantial variance
in expected future corporate returns makes it possible for management
to profit by behaving worse than was expected. Only when bonding
mechanisms induce managers to reduce that variance does the potential
for unfairness dissipate.18 3
To similar effect, Professor Brudney says:
[P]ricing efficiency... is not to be confused with pressure on manage-
ment to operate efficiently or to maximize shareholder wealth in any
given firm.... The "efficiency" of the stock markets does not of its own
force drive management to compete in limiting its rewards or its power
to divert assets, or even to be more effective managers.
184
The assertion that efficient pricing of agency problems is not enough
to ensure development of devices that will eliminate the risk of mana-
gerial misconduct may be correct. But it is irrelevant. As the huge
body of literature on agency costs and the theory of the firm has
demonstrated, there are inevitable costs of delegating power to agents
that are constantly traded off against the benefits of doing so. 185 Thus,
the continued existence of agency costs does-not alone establish either
Empirical Investigation of the Impact of 'Antitakeover'Amendments on Common Stock Prices, 11
J. FIN. ECON. 361 (1983); and (3) state anti-takeover statutes, Hackle & Testani, Second
Generation State Takeover Statutes and Shareholder Wealth: An Empirical Study, 97 YALE L.J.
1193 (1988); Ryngaert & Netter, Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law, 4 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 373 (1988).
183. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 945; see also id. at 942.
184. Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1425; see also Cox, supra note 147, at
747-48; Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1515.
185. See the discussion of the theory of the firm, supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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a problem or a need for regulation.1 86  "Play" in the contracts con-
straining managers should not be confused with inefficiency in the cre-
ation of these contracts. Even if markets cannot perfectly constrain
acts of managers, that does not mean that they cannot discipline the
development of agency contracts, the terms of which are readily
observable and reflected in market price. As discussed in Section III,
the terms of these agency contracts permit both monitoring by mar-
kets, including the corporate control and managerial employment
markets, and gap-filling fiduciary duties. Thus, the parties' contracts
involve deliberate choices between market and legal control of agents.
In short, the presence of play in the corporate contract suggests, rather
than a failure of contracting, a recognition that the least costly way of
dealing with agency costs may be to allow them to be checked by
incentive or monitoring devices instead of by liability rules.
D. Comparison with Limits on Non-corporate Contracts
Many critics of private ordering in the corporation attempt to find
support for government regulation of corporate contracts by drawing
analogies between corporate contracts and non-corporate contracts.
For example, Professor Coffee points out that, even accepting the con-
tractual nature of the corporation, contract terms are, in fact, regu-
lated in other contexts. He cites as an example Uniform Commercial
Code ("U.C.C.") section 2-719(2), which does not permit limitations
or restrictions on Code remedies that would cause the resulting rem-
edy to "fail of its essential purpose." He also could have mentioned,
among other things, the general law on unconscionability,18 7 the
U.C.C.'s general provision on unconscionability, section 2-302, and
prima facie unconscionability of limitations of consequential damages
186. That is not to say that the current level of constraints on managerial misconduct is
optimal. Rather, the point is that the mere failure of existing devices to eradicate agency costs,
absent a showing of facial inadequacy of the terms of the corporate contract (see supra Section
III) or of a market breakdown, is not enough to establish a need for regulation. See Baysinger &
Butler, The Role of Corporate Law, supra note 3, at 191; McChesney, supra note 45, at 1543.
Perhaps in arguing that the market alone does not fully constrain agency costs, Brudney and
Coffee are implicitly returning to their misguided "externality" analysis-that is, the costs of
suboptimal contracts are not borne by the misdealing managers. As we discussed supra at notes
157-58, their analysis is incorrect even in a "lemons" market in which a firm's agency costs are
not fully reflected in the price of its securities, because managers have the incentive to eliminate
this disparity. Generalizing from this discussion, it is clear that, as long as agency problems and
devices constraining them are priced efficiently, this will provide incentive to managers to
optimize these costs.
187. The modern leading case is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960) (exclusion of consumer warranties unconscionable because of obscure drafting and
absence of competition regarding contract terms).
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in cases of personal injury under U.C.C. section 2-719(3). More
broadly, Coffee could have mentioned the entire tort law of products
liability, in which contractual limitations have been swept away by
characterizing the action as one in tort rather than contract. 1
88
It is beyond the scope of this Article to debate the serious question
as to whether any limitations on freedom of contract are appropriate.
Even assuming that some limitations are well founded, legal regulation
of the right of contract should be based on particularized circum-
stances. Superficial analogies like that suggested by Professor Coffee
may result in unwarranted extension of regulation of contracts.
The danger of unwarranted extension is particularly acute regarding
corporate contracts. Public corporation shareholders may superfi-
cially resemble consumers of mass-produced products-dispersed,
incapable of bargaining effectively over terms, and uninformed. Such
a picture of corporate shareholders emerges from Professor Brudney's
analysis."9 In fact, corporate shareholders may seem even more in
need of protection than consumers because the "product" they are
buying is complex, described in arcane terms, and difficult to fully
evaluate.
Despite this superficial similarity, there are substantial differences
between corporate shareholders and consumer product purchasers.
First, as Schwartz and Wilde have demonstrated in the consumer
product context, 190 a market will reach a competitive, rather than a
monopoly, equilibrium as to both price and terms as long as there are
a substantial number of comparison shoppers in the market. This
result holds even if many buyers accept what one seller offers without
shopping. Buyers' search costs are crucial in determining whether
comparison shopping is at a sufficient level to drive the market toward
a competitive equilibrium. Thus, because price advertising reduces
search costs, it is unlikely that a market characterized by such adver-
tising will be noncompetitive.' 91 Conversely, where contract terms are
188. The seminal modem case is Greenman v..Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
189. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
190. Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 638 (1979) [hereinafter Schwartz &
Wilde, Intervening in Markets]; see also Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for
Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L, REv. 1587 (1983).
Professor Coffee relies on the latter article to support his anti-contractarian position. See Coffee,
No Exit, supra note 9, at 935 n.34. As we demonstrate below, this reliance is mistaken.
191. Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets, supra note 190, at 645.
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arcane or obscure, there is a relatively high possibility of monopoly
conditions as to contract terms, other things being equal.'92
The question of when markets are sufficiently noncompetitive to jus-
tify intervention can be complex and difficult in the consumer con-
text. 193 But enough has been said about the Schwartz-Wilde analysis
to make clear the enormous importance of efficient securities markets
in the corporate context. These markets make price information virtu-
ally free. Moreover, securities analysts and the financial press perform
the function of comparison shoppers in the consumer context.' 94 The
difference is that, while in the consumer context information learned
by comparison shoppers cannot be readily communicated to non-shop-
pers, the efficient market facilitates communication of information
learned by analysts and others concerning contract terms. It follows
that, even if there are only a few informed participants, the efficient
securities markets provide pressure toward competitive terms.
Coffee typically overstates the problems facing shareholders at the
same time that he understates the problems in the consumer context.
Notwithstanding the circumstances favoring corporate shareholders,
Professor Coffee argues that shareholders are actually in greater need
of protection than consumers because "in the corporate context...
transaction and information costs are higher." '  More specifically,
the consumer in the corporate securities markets must face the problem
that any material deviation in charter terms may affect future manage-
rial behavior. This consumer is not buying a durable consumer good
whose present quality he can ascertain if he investigates fully, but a
future stream of earnings that may be diverted, wasted or misappropri-
ated by managers who may be able to exploit some special discretion
that these terms give them. In short, these risks are harder to foresee
because they depend on future contingencies and future management
personnel. Information about these risks is not only more costly, it
approaches the unknowable. 19 6
The purchaser of corporate stock is not buying an "unknowable"
future risk of managerial misconduct but, rather, a detailed package
that includes monitoring devices (such as outside boards and
auditors), incentive compensation and managers with substantial
192. Id. at 661. Schwartz and Wilde conclude that egregious obscurity of terms should be an
important factor in whether a court should strike down a contract provision. Id. at 681.
193. Id. at 651-58.
194. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
195. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 937.
196. Id. at 935.
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reputational investments. 197 The terms of this package are priced in
the efficient market. 19 8 The purchaser of an automobile is, on the
other hand, buying an intricately complex machine that he will use
under many different circumstances (some of which are unforeseeable)
over a period of several years. A corporate manager is, indeed, "free"
to run off to Brazil or buy the Brooklyn Bridge if he wants to squander
his reputation and forfeit deferred compensation. But, by the same
token, an automobile can (to use a recent example) defy logic and
decide on its own to back up. In short, the information cost problems
faced by corporate shareholders, when compared to those faced by
consumer product purchasers, are clearly not so daunting as to out-
weigh the advantages of the efficient market in the corporate setting.
Shareholders need to look at only the trading price in order to receive
a normal rate of return.
In comparing corporate shareholders with product consumers, it
also is important to note that the merger of warranty and tort lines of
development in the product area has resulted in abrogation of contract
in consumer cases on "tort" grounds, without regard to whether mar-
kets are functioning competitively. An illustration of this is prima
facie unconscionability in personal injury cases under U.C.C. section
2-719(3). The presence or absence of personal injury has little or noth-
ing to do with whether the contract is the product of market failure.
Rather, the situation seems appropriate for the application of "tort"
objectives, including risk spreading. 199 But tie risk-spreading justifi-
cation for extra-contract liability is wholly absent in the corporate set-
ting.2"° In corporations, as Professor Coffee notes,2"1 it is the
shareholders who are the specialized risk-bearers in light of their abil-
ity to diversify risk by purchasing a portfolio of stocks.2"2 On the
other hand, the managers can neither diversify risk nor, like
197. As such, the corporate contract cannot be regarded as an "experience" good for which
information can be obtained only by using it. See Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior,
78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970); Darby & Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of
Fraud, 16 J. L. & EON. 67, 77-78 (1973).
198. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
199. We would strenuously disagree that, in the absence of market failure, tort liability in the
product setting is justified.
200. For an argument distinguishing all product-related economic loss from personal injury
on risk spreading grounds, see Ribstein, Guidelines for Deciding Product Economic Loss Cases, 29
MERCER L. RaV. 493, 510 (1978).
101. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 928.
202. Specialization of management and risk-bearing functions is discussed supra notes 81-83.
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manufacturers, spread their losses among many customers.20 3 Thus, a
key argument for abrogating contracts in the consumer product set-
ting is absent in the corporate setting.
In conclusion, the anti-contractarian position is weakened rather
than strengthened by the superficial analogy between corporate share-
holders and product consumers. None of the circumstances that have
been cited in justification of regulation in the consumer product setting
justify restricting contracting in the corporate setting.
E. Sorting Costs of Customized Provisions
Professor Coffee contends that the novelty of customized provisions
imposes information and litigation costs.1°4 Among other things,
according to Coffee, in a world of free contract, securities analysts
must not only scrutinize financial performance, but also become expert
in new types of charter provisions.2 "5 A related argument by Profes-
sor Jeffrey N. Gordon is that uninhibited private ordering actually
increases the costs of contract innovation as compared with
mandatory terms because investors, rather than the government,
would have to screen new types of terms.20 6 It seems to follow from
these arguments that private ordering should be restricted even if it
could be shown that the market does adequately price contract terms.
These arguments are not persuasive. In the first place, it is not clear
that the information costs of the new contract terms that would be
permitted under a private ordering regime are greater than those the
market must already deal with. Securities analysts already rapidly
sort a seemingly bewildering amount of information related to firms,
including changing economic conditions and new industrial and finan-
cial technologies. There is no reason to believe that they would have
special difficulty dealing with a few additional types of contract terms.
Second, even if new types of contract terms would impose new
information and litigation costs, this does not make a case for
mandatory limitation of contract terms because the costs of innovation
are internalized. Unless the benefits of innovative terms outweigh the
costs, investors will simply refrain from investing in firms with new
contract terms if information costs have impeded rapid discounting of
203. It follows from Coffee's and Brudney's analysis that the deterrence basis of tort liability
would apply in the corporate context as well because the market alone cannot produce optimal
contract terms. This point is, of course, the central argument debated and refuted in this Article.
204. Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling, supra note 9.
205. Id.
206. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1569-73.
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information into price2 07 or if there is an increased potential for costly
litigation. Thus, market forces have been primarily responsible for
standardization of the terms of bond indentures.20 8 To overcome the
costs of innovation, firms and organizations may back new terms with
reputational capital. In light of these alternatives, there is no benefit to
be served by government screening of terms.
Professor Gordon avoids the internalization point by arguing that
customized charter terms impose costs on users of standard forms.20 9
He asserts that a proliferation of new charter terms will decrease test-
ing of standard terms, thereby reducing the usefulness of the standard
form. In other words, the standard form is a public good that is
threatened by innovation and must be protected by government
regulation.
Gordon's public good argument is deeply flawed. In the first place,
Gordon does not say precisely how decreased testing of standard
terms reduces whatever certainty and predictability the standard
terms have already acquired. This is crucial to Professor Gordon's
externality point, because unless those who have already adopted a
standard form are injured, the costs of standard terms are internalized.
A second problem with Gordon's argument is that mandatory terms
are not necessary to preserve a standard form if it would be widely
accepted (and therefore frequently tested) voluntarily. Thus,
Gordon's argument would stifle the most valuable form of innova-
tion-the evolution of new terms to replace a standard form that
would die if it were not mandated. In sum, instead of preventing
externalization of costs, mandating terms on the basis of the "public
good" theory would impose significant social costs.
F. Charter Amendments
The basic argument in this Section is that markets effectively disci-
pline corporate contract terms. However, the market discipline dis-
cussed to this point is in the form of efficient pricing of terms. This
argument superficially does not seem to apply to charter amendments
that are applied to existing shareholders. These shareholders bought
in on the basis of one contract, and are now subject to another.210
Critics of private ordering have argued that the efficiency of the new
207. As to the interrelation of the cost of information and degree of market efficiency, see
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 142.
208. See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
209. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1567-69.
210. See Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling, supra note 9, at 1674.
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terms is cast in doubt by the fact that dispersed public corporation
shareholders are not adequately protected by the voting process.
Proponents of mandatory terms cite several problems with share-
holder voting. First, dispersed public corporation shareholders are
rationally apathetic. 2" The potential change in the value of an indi-
vidual shareholder's investment in the firm from an amendment nor-
mally does not justify a substantial investment in information or in the
costs of persuading fellow shareholders to oppose the amendment.
Second, management may be able to control the outcome by voting its
own shares 212 and by exerting influence on institutional holders
friendly to management. 213 Third, managers may structure amend-
ments in such a way as to "coerce" shareholders into voting for
amendments that are not in their best interests. 214 For example, it has
been argued that shareholders can be "coerced" into voting for dual
class capitalizations by being offered a dividend sweetener.21 5 The
shareholders may weigh the dividend sweetener more heavily than the
potential loss of a takeover premium because they assume that their
choice is not pivotal. Fourth, the coercion problem is a subclass of the
broader problem of "agenda manipulation" by managers.21 6 Corpora-
tion statutes give managers the exclusive power to decide which
amendments are presented to the shareholders.217 Thus, according to
this view, the managers can limit the shareholders' choice to amend-
ments that will win approval because they are wealth-increasing, but
may, among other things, couple desirable with undesirable terms, or
confront shareholders faced by an unattractive takeover with the
barely lesser evil of a very stringent takeover defense.
211. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 1837; Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1478; Gordon, supra note
9, at 1576.
212. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1580 (arguing that this reinforces the shareholders' rational
apathy).
213. See Eisenberg, supra note 9. Note, however, that market and legal constraints generally
will cause institutions to vote with management only as long as this is consistent with
shareholder welfare. Moreover, Eisenberg ignores the fact that the institutional holders' ties to
management, far from "tainting" their votes, increase shareholder welfare by facilitating better
monitoring. See Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law, supra note 3, at 181.
214. See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1477; Gordon, supra note 9, at 1577-80.
215. See Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock- The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA.
L. REV. 807, 833-34 (1987); Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the
Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (1988). This argument helped
persuade the Securities and Exchange Commission to limit dual class recalitalizations. See
Notice of Proposed Rule 19c-4, Exchange Act Release No. 34-24,623, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,665,
23,668 (proposed June 22, 1987) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.19c-4 (1989)).
216. See Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 45-46.
217. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (1983).
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These arguments are infected by two types of problems. First, they
ignore substantial market constraints on shareholder voting. While
the average shareholder may have little incentive to acquire informa-
tion or persuade fellow shareholders to vote against wealth-decreasing
amendments, large institutional holders do have such incentives, and
increasingly have been exercising their prerogatives.2 18 Even if such
holders do not control a majority, managers may be unwilling to risk
turning the vote on the amendment into a referendum on management
that puts the company in "play." Moreover, because an inefficient
shareholder decision will reduce corporate share prices, this provides a
profit opportunity for an investor to aggregate sufficient stock to
change or block the decision.
A second, and even more serious, problem with arguments about
defects in shareholder voting is that they assume that mandatory rules
are a better solution to these problems than contractual and market
constraints. The corporate charter itself limits the extent to which it
can be amended. The charter can forestall problems like those dis-
cussed above by prescribing general voting procedures or by prohibit-
ing certain types of amendments. For example, if agenda
manipulation is a real problem, the charter, at least under a private
ordering regime, could liberalize the rules for shareholder-proposed
amendments 219 or'could prohibit coercive tactics such as dividend
sweeteners. Indeed, in light of the state competition for charters, sur-
vival of many currently mandatory terms may be explained as a
response to the amendment problem.22 The presence or absence of
charter provisions limiting amendment is disciplined by the same mar-
kets that constrain other charter provisions.221 As a result, if liberal
amendment provisions open the way to opportunistic amendments,
the cost of capital of firms offering such provisions will increase.222
Of course, charter provisions limiting amendments are no more
likely to operate perfectly than are any other charter provisions. The
costs of such restrictions include rigidity and hold-up problems.223
But the existence of these potential problems does not itself establish
218. See Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals and Corporate Democracy, 23
GA. L. REv. 97 (1988).
219. The current rule requiring proposal by the board is mandatory. See supra note 217.
220. This implies that changes in such binding commitments may be contrary to the
corporate contract. See infra note 290 and accompanying text.
221. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9.
222. Thus, Professors Bebchuk and Coffee are wrong in asserting that.entrepreneurs do not
bear the cost of value-decreasing amendments. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 1829, 1837; Coffee,
Mandatory/Enabling, supra note 9, at 1674.
223. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1581-86.
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that mandatory rules would be any better. Courts and legislators do
not have a larger arsenal of weapons against opportunistic amend-
ments than do the parties themselves. The question is whether they
are more likely to choose the correct devices. As discussed in the next
Section, there is substantial reason to believe that they are not.
V. EVALUATING MANDATORY RULES
The efficient functioning of the securities markets powerfully disci-
plines the development of optimal corporate contracts.2 24 Indeed,
contracts reflect sensitive tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of
various contract terms. 225 All of this provides strong evidence that
government regulation of corporate contract terms is unnecessary.
But even if there were a strong case for government regulation due to
market failure, this alone would not justify regulation without a fur-
ther showing that regulation is likely to produce better corporate
arrangements than private ordering. In this Section we show the dan-
gers of the "nirvana fallacy"-the naive assumption that regulation
will function perfectly if markets do not.
A. The Inefficiency of Mandatory Terms
Critics of private ordering devote much effort to showing that pri-
vate arrangements, including bonding and incentive compensation, do
not substantially constrain management misconduct. They conclude
from this that regulation is necessary. The unspoken assumption in
their policy recommendations is that mandatory rules are better than
results achieved through private ordering. A discussion of a few cor-
porate law rules bearing on the directors' duty of care demonstrates
that their assumption is unwarranted.
The directors' duty of care results in imposition of liability for vast
amounts for acts that were not intentionally harmful and that by defi-
nition did not benefit the directors. The benefit of this duty to the
corporation is that it deters careless management. The cost is that it
places a substantial business risk on managers2 26 who, unlike the
shareholders, are unable to reduce the risk by diversification and are
224. See supra Section IV.
225. See supra Section III.
226. For example, in the celebrated case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985),
a negligence action was upheld against directors who ultimately settled prior to a damage
determination for $23.5 million, of which the insurance carrier paid only $10 million. Trans
Union Corp., Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1985, at 18, col. 3.
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therefore relatively inefficient risk-bearers.227 One result may be that
the managers act more conservatively than is in the shareholders'
interests, in order to reduce the risk of liability. This is obviously a
sensitive tradeoff, and it is not inherently obvious that any court's bal-
ance will be either correct or even an improvement over the terms
drafted by the parties to a corporate contract.
Even recognizing that some duty of care is optimal, there is the
additional question of what conduct falls over the negligence line. The
courts, in applying the business judgment rule, have demanded adher-
ence to a particular process of decisionmaking. For example, in Smith
v. Van Gorkum,228 directors were condemned for agreeing to a price
that was substantially in excess of current market value without get-
ting a formal appraisal although, as one dissenting judge forcefully
pointed out,229 they had substantial business expertise and long experi-
ence with the company. 23° The implication is that courts are able to
determine optimal procedures in reaching business decisions. How-
ever, as has been argued by Bayless Manning, the question of alloca-
tion of directors' time among myriad tasks is itself a sensitive business
decision that directors, and not courts, are peculiarly able to make.231
And even if the courts actually reach the right results in most cases,
their vague rules create ex ante constraints on manager conduct and
provide the basis for costly and wasteful litigation.
Apart from the problems concerning the duty of care and its appli-
cation, there are questions concerning the procedures for holding man-
agers accountable. Should the board be able to decide which suits are
prosecuted, or should individual shareholders be given that power
through the derivative suit mechanism? Giving total discretion to
directors raises the conflict of interest problem. But the derivative
remedy can be quite costly, not only in terms of direct litigation and
attorneys' fees, but in terms of such indirect costs as demands on man-
agers' time and interference with valuable long-term relations between
the managers and the corporation.232 Moreover, it is not clear that
227. Professor Coffee has forcefully noted this point. See Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 928;
Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 789, 801-03 (1984) (also noting that shareholders are relatively poorly
situated to prevent mismanagement).
228. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
229. See opinion of Justice McNeilly, 488 A.2d at 894-95.
230. For a stinging criticism of the Van Gorkum case, see Fischel, The Business Judgment
Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985).
231. Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for
Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477 (1984).
232. See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 125, at 268-70.
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conflict problems are eliminated by taking the decision out of the
directors' hands given the imperfect incentives of plaintiffs' counsel.23 3
Finally, even if the procedural problems of a derivative suit are
solved, it is not clear if the derivative suit is an appropriate remedy
because the benefits of the derivative remedy are unclear. In particu-
lar, there are serious questions concerning whether this remedy serves
any compensatory role, since many of the shareholders of the corpora-
tion at the time recovery is administered are likely to have bought
their shares at prices that already reflected the wrong from sharehold-
ers whose shares were devalued by the wrong.2 34
Given the doubts concerning whether either the directors' or plain-
tiff's counsel are the appropriate guardians of the corporate interest,
perhaps both could be given a role with the court as the final arbiter as
the Delaware Supreme Court decided in Zapata Corp. v. Maldo-
nado.2 35 But splitting the baby rarely improves her health: the special
litigation committee process endorsed in Zapata can consume enor-
mous time and resources before it reaches its tortuous end.23 6
The problems raised by existing fiduciary law are illustrated by a
recent Delaware case involving payment of "greenmail" by managers
to bidders for control. The vague business judgment rule leaves ques-
tions as to whether a payment to preserve management control is cov-
ered by the rule and, if it is, as to the directors' decision-making
process and the substance of the decision. In Polk v. Good, 237 a green-
mail case finally concluded with supreme court approval of a settle-
ment establishing that the shareholders could decide how certain stock
could be voted and that the plaintiffs' discovery material would be dis-
closed. Achievement of this momentous result occurred only after
preliminary litigation involving whether plaintiff must serve a demand
on the board. 238 The plaintiff's attorney received $700,000 in fees plus
expenses. It is not hard to imagine why a corporation's shareholders
would seek to opt out of a set of rules producing litigation like this.
233. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney- The Implications of Economic Theory
for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669
(1986): Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1985); Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the
Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983).
234. See Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 880 (1982); Cox, supra note 147, at 765-74.
235. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
236. For a forceful exposition of this problem, see Chancellor Brown's opinion in Kaplan v.
Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff'd, 499 A.2d 1184 (Del. 1985).
237. 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986).
238. See Good v. Texaco, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 854 (Del. Ch. 1985).
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Examples of the problems raised by existing fiduciary law could be
multiplied endlessly. But further discussion of these problems is
unnecessary to make our point because the anti-contractarian position
does not rest on satisfaction with the current law. Professor Brudney
sharply criticizes the laxity of current law on managerial diversion of
assets239 and notes the problem of balancing costs and benefits of lia-
bility for negligence24 and diversion of assets.241 Professor Coffee, the
architect of the remedy limitation provision in the A.L.I. project,242
defends it by noting the problems with current due care liability of
directors.243 Describing the derivative remedy, Coffee says "[flew, if
any, would claim... that the result is an optimal remedy on which
private ordering could not improve. '
B. Institutional Defects of Legal Rules
Coffee and Brudney argue the deficiencies of corporate markets as
evidence against the desirability of private ordering. They therefore
implicitly assume that these inherent problems of private ordering are
worse than the institutional weaknesses afflicting development of legal
rules. But even if markets are deficient, it is necessary to ask whether
legal institutions are likely to lead to better results than private order-
ing. The question is not whether anti-contractarian law professors can
think of better mandatory rules than those that currently exist, but
whether courts and legislatures are likely to adopt such rules, and then
change them in response to changing circumstances.
Insofar as judicially imposed rules are concerned, there are serious
deficiencies in the courts' abilities to formulate governance rules.
First, in deciding particular cases, courts are virtually always con-
fronted with bad results. This sample bias causes courts to errone-
ously assume that the bad result was a product of poor managerial
performance.245 Second, most courts, particularly those outside Dela-
ware, decide corporate cases only sporadically and lack expertise in
corporate matters. Third, even if a case is correctly decided, it leads to
a result on particular facts that has only uncertain application to other
239. Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1434-35.
240. Id. at 1443.
241. Id. at 1438-39.
242. See supra note 8.
243. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 927-31.
244. Id. at 970.
245. See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 125, at 265.
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cases. Fourth, unlike managers, judges are not inspired to write opti-
mal corporate rules by a proprietary interest or by shareholder moni-
toring. Fifth, even if the court attempts to formulate a general rule, it
is limited in its ability to formulate policy by its own resources and by
the nature of the adversarial process.246 There is, therefore, sound
basis for Professor Coffee's statement that "the case for private order-
ing is that the parties can recognize their own self-interest more
quickly than the courts.
2 47
Both legislative and judicial rulemaking share the institutional
problems of generality and stasis. Even a rule that is formulated by an
all-wise and disinterested policymaker cannot suit every business
equally well, any more than a well-made suit is right for everybody.
The literature on the theory of the firm reveals a wide range of organi-
zational forms, each adapted to different circumstances.248 Organiza-
tions that need to own substantial resources or that involve complex
decision processes will look very different from smaller, simpler firms,
and will adopt very different governance structures. Within general
types of organization there are many subvariations, such as whether
the resources are specialized to particular uses2 4 9 or whether the firm
operates in a regulated industry.25° Moreover, even a rule that is both
initially perfect and initially suited to a particular firm may become
imperfect or unsuitable over time as a result of rapidly changing busi-
ness conditions. Both legislative and judicial rules tend to remain past
their welcome.
An additional component of the "nirvana" fallacy concerns the
motivations of political agents.25' Any deficiencies in the behavior of
corporate agents vis-a-vis shareholders are minor compared to those of
legislators vis-a-vis their constituents.252 Moreover, throwing corpo-
rate governance issues into the legislative arena would only compound
246. See Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets, supra note 190, at 678 (advocating
administrative rather than judicial intervention in markets because the stakes in individual cases
are seldom sufficient to justify broad inquiry).
247. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 931.
248. See supra Section III(A).
249. See the discussion of resource "plasticity," supra note 91 and accompanying text.
250. See Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 116, at 1161; Baysinger & Zardkoohi, Technology,
Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 339 (1986).
251. It is therefore wrong to suggest, as does Professor Bebchuk, supra note 9, that
government is better able to solve corporate problems than private parties merely because it may
have more resources to apply to potential solutions.
252. R. MCCORMICK & R. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION AND THE ECONOMY: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST GROUP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 6 (1981). Indeed, no one's
motivations are beyond question. Because courts may be subject to various types of legislative
pressure, it is no solution to broadly leave corporate questions for judicial determination, as
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corporate agency problems because managers surely possess a compar-
ative advantage at getting legislation passed. The recent passage of
takeover-specific antitakeover statutes illustrates the political problems
that can arise when the managers are free to use corporate resources to
rewrite corporate governance contracts through the political pro-
cess. 253 Failures of private corporate contracts, if such failures exist at
all, are surely less costly than attempting to solve these failures by
resorting to political markets.
For the above reasons, even assuming a case can be made in this
area for market failure, there is substantial reason to believe that a
process of evolution of corporate rules through private ordering is
preferable to a system of mandatory rules.254
C. Exploring the Middle Ground: Coffee's "'Brand Name" Proposal
Although Professor Coffee squarely recognizes the deficiencies of
the current system of corporate rules,255 he has sufficient reservations
concerning the efficiency of markets that he is not willing to fully
endorse private ordering. Instead of choosing either the contractual or
the concession theory, Coffee attempts to stake out a "middle
ground." This seems to be more like a political effort to salvage what is
left of the anti-contractarian approach to corporation law after a dec-
ade of attacks by contract theorists than a true recognition of the mer-
its of the contractual theory. Nevertheless, an analysis of his "middle
ground" provides an instructive illustration of the weakness of attacks
on private ordering.
Coffee's "middle ground" solution is to permit opting out of stan-
dard duties in the usual case only by means of "brand name" forms
developed by the American Bar Association, American Law Institute
suggested by Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling, supra note 9, at 1685. Professor Clark, in Contracts,
Elites, supra note 9, at 1731-32, suggests that resolving corporate issues by "tradition" would
solve the problem of imperfect incentives of "elite" lawmakers. But "tradition" must be applied
by people, particularly including courts.
The motivation problem underlying mandatory legal rules goes even deeper. As Irving Kristol
has suggested, law professors proposing broad legal intrusion into corporate governance stand to
gain as lawyers, consultants, and outside directors. See Kristol, The War Against the
Corporation, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1989, at A20, col. 3.
253. See Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate
Law, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 365; Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L.
REV. Ill (1987).
254. See Baysinger & Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporation Law: The ALI's
Project and the Independent Director, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 557 (1984).
255. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
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or stock exchanges.256 He justifies this limitation on private ordering
on the ground that private contracts would be extremely detailed and
untested, resulting in high information costs2 57 and the risk of manipu-
lation by managers. His premise is that better results can be achieved
by mandatory limitations on what contracts corporations can adopt
than through private ordering.
There are serious problems with Coffee's proposal. In the first
place, there are myriad questions of application. What is a "brand
name," apart from the three types of organizations Coffee mentions?
What about forms written by the Georgia Bar Association or The
Business Roundtable, to name two of the thousands of reputable orga-
nizations that might propose standard forms. Undue limitation would
stunt the process of development, but attenuation of the definition also
would blunt Coffee's point about reduction of information costs. Also,
what is a "form?" Must a corporation adopt an entire form charter,
or is a section enough? If a section is enough, what about a subsection
or a clause? Limiting the definition sharply reduces flexibility, but
expanding it raises information costs.
Assuming Coffee's idea can be given a manageable shape, there
remain substantial problems of mandating reliance on brand name
forms. Brand name forms may be costly because they share with judi-
cial decisions and legislation problems of generality and stasis.25 As
Coffee notes, " 'off-the-rack' rules may not fit all sizes or shapes of
corporations." '259 This problem cannot be readily resolved by develop-
ing many standard forms because, as we have noted,26° the firm is an
almost infinite regression on many variables. In order for brand
names to even begin to approximate this variety, the selection would
have to resemble the display of goods in a large department store, with
a consequent loss of the information-cost advantage of brand name
forms.
The stasis problem is even more serious, and exists in two dimen-
sions. In the first place, as Coffee notes, the corporate contract, partic-
ularly regarding remedies, must be quite detailed. It is unrealistic to
expect that any form or set of forms would get these details right on
the first try. Only an evolutionary process can succeed, and evolution,
256. Development of rules by competing stock exchanges would be preferred to national
mandatory rules. See Fischel, Organized Exchanges, supra note 72, at 130-31.
257. For a discussion of this type of argument against private ordering, see supra Section
IV(E).
258. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
259. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 973.
260. See supra Section III(A).
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whether by large associations or small committees, is significantly
slower than evolution by private ordering. Second, even a perfect
form will become imperfect over time as conditions change. Again,
evolution is necessary.
Despite these costs of brand name forms, it is likely that many firms
will select them under a private ordering regime, as they have done
with the American Bar Foundation Model Debenture Indenture,
261
always weighing the costs against the benefits in a particular situa-
tion.262 The important question is whether this selection process is
likely to be so flawed by managerial opportunism that it would be pref-
erable to mandate brand name forms. This, like other questions con-
cerning the desirability of private ordering, necessitates considering
the deficiencies of both the market process and regulation.
As to problems with voluntary selection of forms, it is again neces-
sary to emphasize the importance of efficient market pricing. Like
other facts concerning a company, uncertainty and information cost
problems of customized forms, as well as the advantages of custom
tailoring, will be reflected in the price of a company's stock and affect
its cost of capital which, in turn, will constrain optimal selection by
managers. It is not enough, therefore, for Coffee to argue that custom-
ized forms may be disadvantageous for investors; he also must show
that these problems are not reflected in price. He does not attempt to
do so, thereby implicitly relying on his general concerns about'market
pricing. But even if Coffee is correct about the problems of pricing the
risk of managerial misconduct, which we dispute,263 these arguments
do not apply to the form selection process because the adoption or
nonadoption of a brand name form is an obvious datum that is readily
assimilated into market price. Coffee himself recognizes this general
point when he notes that companies that opt out of fiduciary duties are
penalized in the market. 2 4 If that is so, and we agree with Coffee on
this point, then Coffee must explain why there is no penalty for a com-
pany that opts out of other standard provisions.
Even if the market does not perfectly discipline form selection, there
remains the question whether mandatory reliance on forms would be
261. See Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN.
ECON. 117, 122-23 (1979).
262. Coffee correctly notes that recognized forms reduce information costs by facilitating
efficient market pricing of terms. See Bratton, supra note 56, at 686. They also reduce error and,
by reason of broad acceptance by the courts, uncertainty. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 56, at
265-73.
263. See supra notes 152-162 and accompanying text.
264. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 948.
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any better. One result of the mandatory system is, obviously, to pro-
hibit the use of customary provisions even when a disinterested party
would conclude that the benefits of this approach clearly outweigh the
costs. Perhaps more importantly, mandatory brand name forms
would exacerbate rather than ameliorate problems of management
misdealing. The problem is that the form drafting process is subject to
manipulation by management-oriented interests. Because individual
managers have much to gain from the drafting process, and because
they are already organized into coherent groups like the Business
Roundtable, they have a distinct advantage over dispersed investors in
forming interest groups that will dominate the drafting of brandname
forms. 65 While this is an inherent problem with brand name forms, it
becomes an intractable one when the defects of self-interested forms
cannot be competed away by companies seeking a lower cost of capital
by offering customized investor-oriented provisions. In other words,
mandatory brand name forms will further politicize the development
of corporate law,266 bringing on all of the defects involved in the polit-
ical process.
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of Coffee's brand name proposal is
that he does not really seem to be serious about it. In the first place,
he would permit companies to adopt customized provisions in some
circumstances. 67 The proponent can show that "the modification was
prompted by unforeseen new circumstances." Also, "[a] more permis-
sive standard should apply to provisions in the original certificate of
incorporation, but in the case of amendments this burden should be a
substantial one in the case of major deviation, at least when the provi-
sion seemingly exposes shareholders to a risk of managerial
opportunism.
268
These distinctions do not clearly relate to the concerns about private
ordering that prompted the limitation to brand name forms. The dis-
tinction for "unforeseen new circumstances" is based on the general
265. On the relative advantages of forming politically effective coalitions for different size
organizations, see J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 286-88 (1962).
In fact, managers' advantages over shareholders in taking collective action have been cited in
favor of federal regulation of corporate law, the theory being that managers' advantages are
greater at the state than at the federal level. See Anderson, supra note 9, at 789. As discussed
infra Section VI(D), federal regulation is an important part of the anti-contractarian agenda.
266. On the politicization of corporate law, see Butler, supra note 253; Macey & Miller,
Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporation Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987);
Romano, supra note 253.
267. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 973.
268. Id.
Washington Law Review
common law contract rule regarding modifications. 269 As such, it
relates to whether the modification is consistent with the parties' con-
tract, and not to whether private ordering should be sustained. 270 The
original provision distinction also is significant only to whether opt-
out violates the parties' contract.271
The second indication that Coffee is not serious about his
brandname proposal is that he clearly would not necessarily permit
opt-out even by brand name provisions. Rather, he suggests a "judicial
inquiry" focusing on the following questions:
(1) Does the provision represent a bargain that we can credibly
believe rational shareholders might strike among themselves or with
managers and the other participants in the corporation?; (2) Does the
substituted or limited remedy fail of its essential purpose?; (3) Is any
clearly expressed legislative policy violated?; and (4) Can shareholders
price the departure or does it involve risks that are too uncertain for the
pricing mechanism to work without creating unproductive
uncertainty?272
By thus qualifying the brand name approach and indicating his dis-
trust of market constraints on contract terms, Coffee exits the "middle
ground" and rejoins the staunch anti-contractarian position.
In general, even if the ambiguities and internal inconsistencies in
Coffee's brand name proposal can be resolved, his attempt to capture a
middle ground suffers from the same defects as the general arguments
against private ordering: it overstates the defects of private ordering
and understates the defects of the regulatory approach. In other
words, once again succumbing to the "nirvana" fallacy, he incorrectly
assumes that because the process of private ordering is not perfect,
mandatory brand name forms will be better.
269. See id. at 939, 973 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(D)
(1979)). One writer explains this rule as a way of allocating the burden of proof as to whether
modification is opportunistic. Muds, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contract, 65 MINN.
L. REv. 521, 550 (1981). It is not clear how Coffee's qualifications concerning "major
deviation[s]" and the "risk of managerial opportunism" relate to the qualification concerning
"unforeseen new circumstances."
270. See infra note 290 and accompanying text.
271. It is hard to see how market failure could explain the difference between original
provisions and amendments, since each would be equally subject to efficient market pricing.
272. Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 974.
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D. The Difficulty of Regulating Terms and the Inevitability of
Contract
The discussion so far in this Section has assumed that regulation of
corporate contract terms is feasible. In fact, formidable practical diffi-
culties attend this type of regulation, even if it was otherwise war-
ranted on policy grounds. The reason is that any regulation that
proscribed certain terms would inevitably leave room for substitution
of other terms, or at least for a substitution of forms of organiza-
tion.273 Thus, for example, it is unclear how statutes mandating
appraisal rights in the event of a "merger" should apply to such
merger-like transactions as asset sales 74 or changes in control or
structure. 75 With regard to substitution of forms, limitations of the
voting structure of corporations (i.e., by forbidding dual class com-
mon) can be circumvented by forming a publicly traded limited part-
nership.2 76 The partnership technique would also be available for
circumvention of limits on opting out of fiduciary duties. 77 In gen-
eral, the possibilities are endless because, as discussed above,27 8 the
corporation is part of a continuum of contractual forms that includes
not only forms of business organization, but other types of relational
contracts. Even the anti-contractarians would oppose limiting the
rights of business participants to select the form that is optimal for
their business. Leaving many questions for judicial determination2 79
would create intolerable uncertainty. Thus, although opponents of
private ordering in the corporation seek to ignore the contractual
nature of the corporation, this underlying fact must ultimately be
controlling.
273. For a discussion noting this problem in the consumer contract area, see Schwartz &
Wilde, supra note 190, at 667. Even if limitations on opt-out provisions cannot be completely
evaded and therefore are at least partially effective, the substitutability of terms results in
considerable confusion and unpredictability, thereby increasing investor uncertainty as brand
names necessarily convey less than complete information.
274. See, e.g., Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
275. See, e.g., Pratt v. Ballman-Cummings Furniture Co., 254 Ark. 570, 495 S.W.2d 509
(1973).
276. See generally Ribstein, Limited Partnership, supra note 3.
277. The Uniform Partnership Act, which applies in this respect to both limited and general
partnerships, permits a partner to receive an individual benefit from the firm with the consent of
the other partners. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 21, 6 U.L.A. 258 (1969). Thus, a partner
may be permitted under the partnership agreement to reap personal benefit from partnership
opportunities. See Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981). See generally A.
BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 6.07(h) (1988).
278. See supra Section III(A).
279. This is proposed by Coffee, Mandatory/Enabling, supra note 9, at 1685.
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E. The Normative Assumption and the Burden of Proof
Once it is recognized that there are serious problems with regulation
of corporate contract terms, even the critics of private ordering must
confront the question of which position should bear the burden of
proof. Professor Brudney recognizes this problem (although not all of
its implications) when he accuses contractarians of believing: "that a
regime of private contractual arrangements is in some sense 'natural'
or proper and requires no justification; but government intervention to
cure defects in, or remove impediments to, the assumed consensual
process is 'unnatural,' and is permissible only when justified ...."'I'
But the converse position may be ascribed to those who oppose pri-
vate ordering. By relying on unsubstantiated assertions that markets
are defective and by refusing to compare these defects with those
under a system of government regulation of corporate contract terms,
the anti-contractarians appear to place the burden on the contractari-
ans to prove that private ordering is warranted. This, of course, will
be a difficult burden for contractarians to meet, since any evidence for
private ordering -under a system characterized by mandatory rules
must be hypothetical and speculative.
Nowhere do the anti-contractarians give a coherent rationale for
placing the burden on one side or the other. In fact, the approach
throughout the law of contract is to presume in favor of private order-
ing until some type of market failure can be shown. The only reason
for departing from this presumption in the corporate context would be
if the corporation was not regarded as a contractual relationship. But
the dominant trend in corporate law over the last 200 years has been
to free corporate law from its state concession origins and treat it as a
contractual relationship.281 Therefore, if the general presumption
from private ordering is departed from in this context, it must be
because of adherence to the historical rather than modern position.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF PRIVATE ORDERING
This Section extends the analysis of private ordering beyond the
general question of whether corporate contracts opting out of fiduciary
duties should be enforced to a discussion of precisely what enforce-
ment of such contracts entails. The relevant issues concern interpreta-
tion and application of the parties' agreement and the appropriate
roles of federal and state law.
280. Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 1408-09.
281. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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A. Opt-Out Provisions by Unanimous Agreement
It follows from the contractarian position that the parties to a cor-
poration ought to be able to fashion fiduciary duties or remedies at
least by means of a provision in the charter or shareholders' agreement
that is agreed to by all shareholders as of the time the provision is
adopted.282 Investors who buy into the corporation after adoption of
the provision should be deemed to consent to the arrangement.
The fact that the opt-out provision should be enforced leaves open
the question of interpretation. Thus, for example, it is not clear what a
court would make of a provision that permitted managers to take any
or all corporate opportunities for their benefit. A court might interpo-
late an implied condition that the manager not take all the good
opportunities and leave only the bad ones for the company.28 3 The
basis for such an interpolation might be evidence of actual expecta-
tions, or a conclusion that without the condition the bargain was so
one-sided that it is unreasonable to assume that the parties actually
agreed to it.284 As long as enforceability hinges solely on interpreta-
tion, it is consistent with the contractual theory of the corporation. It
is important to emphasize, however, that the court's function is solely
one of interpretation. There is no justification for an expansive judicial
role in corporate affairs that includes imposing fiduciary duties on all
firms as a "canon of construction. '28 5
B. Opt-Out Provisions by Subunanimous Vote
Where opt out provisions are adopted by charter provision or other
shareholder agreement28 6 and all current holders do not consent, the
contractual theory of the corporation suggests that the question con-
cerning validity is whether the governance rules of the corporation
should be interpreted to permit subunanimous consent. Even if the
282. As discussed infra Section VI(C), statutory authorization should not be necessary. As
discussed in Section VI(D), the opt-out also may take the form of selection of the standard form
contract through the state chartering decision.
283. See Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D. Colo. 1972), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 481 F.2d 34 144 (1973), in which a provision stating that directors were "hereby
relieved from any liability that might otherwise arise by reason of his contracting with the
corporation for the benefit of himself or any firm or corporation in which he may in any way be
interested" was held not to validate unfair director compensation.
284. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 5.09 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1987) permits variation of self-
dealing duties only as to "specified" transactions that are likely to "recur in the ordinary course
of business of the corporation." While we would oppose such a rigid limitation, this type of
provision may be advisable in order to avoid the interpretation problem discussed in the text.
285. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
286. Opt-out by statutory provision is discussed infra Sections VI(C), VI(D).
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statute28 7  and certificate generally permit amendment by
subunanimous vote, this power of amendment has not been applied to
provisions concerning transferability of shares.2"' The qualification
also may extend to other matters, including amendment of class voting
requirements that protect limited-vote shareholders from controlling
shareholders.28 9 If such a qualification applies to a provision opting
out of fiduciary duties, a free contracting perspective indicates that the
provision should be enforced.2 90 It follows that a statute that imposed
an opt-out provision in the face of such a qualification would trump
the corporate contract, and would accordingly be unenforceable under
the Contract Clause.
The law respecting opt-out is inconclusive. The Delaware statute
permits amendment "in any and as many respects as may be desired;
so long as its certificate of incorporation as amended would contain
only such provisions as it would be lawful and proper to insert in an
original certificate of incorporation filed at the time of the filing of the
amendment. ' 291 The certificate may include, among other things,
"any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers
of the. . . directors. ' 292 No statutory provision in Delaware defines
the directors' duty of care, although the duty of loyalty is covered in
the statute.293 There is apparently no case law authority expressly per-
mitting opting out of negligence liability, and only mixed authority on
opting out of self-dealing liability.294
Perhaps there is sufficiently strong investor expectation of the con-
tinued existence of some director duties that the shareholders would
assume that they could veto complete abrogation of these duties. But
shareholders invest with the knowledge of a very broad power of
287. The role of statutory provisions concerning the amendment power is discussed infra
Section VI(). Opting out of statutory limitations through reincorporation is discussed infra
Section VI(D).
288. See B & H Warehouse, Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1974);
Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 962 n.91. Retroactive share transfer restrictions may also be
invalid by statute. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(b) (Supp. 1988).
289. See Butler & Ribstein, Contract Clause, supra note 3.
290. See Black, supra note 9. 145
291. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(a) (1983).
292. Id. § 102(b)(1).
293. Id. § 144.
294. As to opting out of liability for self-dealing, compare Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F.
Supp. 687, 701 (D. Colo. 1972) (broad opt-out provision did not validate unfair director
compensation), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 481 F.2d 34 (1973) with Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107, 118 (1952) (enforcing charter provision that permitted
counting interested director toward a quorum, and approving opt-outs that do not violate statute
or "public policy settled by the common law"); see also supra note 129 (explicit terms have been
held to preclude application of fiduciary duties).
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amendment, 295 including as to such important matters as shareholder
voting percentages. Moreover, it is essential that the shareholders
have flexibility to adapt the contract to changing conditions and to
correct erroneous judicial interpretations of the corporate contract, a
possible example of which is the tight standard of care articulated in
Smith v. Van Gorkom.296 Therefore, limitations on the shareholders'
power to at least adjust director duties probably are not anticipated
and should not be enforced unless explicitly set forth in the charter or
other agreement.
297
C. The Role of Statutory Authorization
There is a substantial debate among the Reporters for A.L.I. project
as to whether statutory authorization is necessary to validate opt-out
provisions, with Coffee supporting the section 7.17 approach of vali-
dating opt-outs even in the absence of a charter provision, and the
Chief Reporter and Reporter for Part IV insisting on legislative
authority.29 This debate is an example of how the anti-contract posi-
tion can result in focusing attention on the wrong issue. A statute is
not necessary to validate a private contract, although it may reduce
costs by providing a standard form or reducing uncertainty as to valid-
ity of the provision created by prior case law.2 99 Nor is a statute nec-
essarily sufficient to validate an opt out that is contrary to the parties'
agreement because such a statute might abrogate the contract in viola-
tion of the Contract Clause. 3"
295. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(a) (1983) ("corporation ... may amend its
certificate of incorporation ... in any and as many respects as may be desired").
296. 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985); see supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
297. For a similar discussion from the perspective of the Contract Clause, see Butler &
Ribstein, Contract Clause, supra note 3. As noted supra notes 267, 269 and accompanying text,
Coffee would apply the general contract limitation on modifications, including an "unanticipated
circumstances" qualification. This helps to ensure that one party is not exploiting a bargaining
advantage to extract concessions from another. See Muris, supra note 269, at 532-52. However,
it may be preferable to enforce the contract, including its amendment provisions, according to its
express terms rather than resorting to vague, open-ended limitations on these terms. See
Ribstein, Takeover Defenses, supra note 3. Moreover, concerns about opportunism by a
contracting party are misplaced where the managers lack voting power or other leverage to force
"concessions" from the shareholders. As to the viability of shareholder voting on charter
amendments in the context of the financial markets, see supra notes 218-21 and accompanying
text.
298. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 139-43 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1989).
299. A permissive opt-out statute should be phrased in "unless otherwise agreed" language to
clearly avoid negative pregnant construction.
300. For discussions of the application of the Contract Clause in the corporate setting, see
generally Butler & Ribstein, Anti-Takeover, supra note 3; Butler & Ribstein, Contract Clause,
supra note 3. The Delaware opt-out provision, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988),
for example, might be subject to this problem. The provision is valid only if it merely clarifies an
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From both a private law and constitutional perspective, the most
offensive statute is one that simply changes the directors' duties for all
corporations incorporated in the state.3" 1 In such a situation, the cor-
porations' agent-principal problem can be exacerbated by the exercise
of political power by corporate managers to rewrite agency con-
tracts.3 °2 These costs of unstable corporate statutes can be reduced
but not completely eliminated through competition in the market for
state charters. 3 3 This is an important point, because where private
ordering is limited and preempted by statutory mandate, all change
will be legislatively imposed on the shareholders.3 4 In essence, as
already noted, the anti-contractarian reduces to replacing the share-
holders' contractual safeguards with the unilateral power of corporate
managers working through state legislators.
D. Opting Out By Selecting the State Statute: Federal Versus State
Law
Even if one or more state statutes preclude opting out of fiduciary
duties, the parties to a corporate contract may be able to enter into an
enforceable opt-out provision by incorporating under a state statute
that permits opt-out provisions.30 5 In light of this observation, it is not
surprising that, both expressly and implicitly in their repeated criti-
cism of state law, 30 6  the anti-contractarians argue in favor of
amendment power that existed prior to enactment of the provision rather than enlarging the
majority's power to amend the contract. It is not enough to avoid Contract Clause problems to
provide, as does the Delaware statute, that a charter provision cannot affect director liability for
acts already committed because such a provision might still permit abrogation of the directors'
duty for subsequent acts in violation of the initial contract.
301. For recent statutory definitions of director duties that eliminate negligence liability for
corporations chartered in the applicable state, see IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Bums Supp.
1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (1987). For a discussion of the similar problems raised by
changes in indemnification provisions, see Butler & Ribstein, Free At Last? The Contractual
Theory of the Corporation and the New Maryland Officer-Director Liability Provisions, 18 U.
BALT. L. REV. - (1989).
The mandatory aspect of such imposed changes is also recognized by Black, supra note 9;
Clark, Contracts, Elites, supra note 9, at 1721-22.
302. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
303. See Butler, supra note 253. As to the chartering market, see infra notes 311-313 and
accompanying text.
304. Cf Coffee, No Exit, supra note 9, at 953, noting that Brudney's approach "forces us to
rely on legislative revisions that impact on all shareholders, including those of firms that would
not have opted out." Coffee's limited "brand name" regulatory regime is subject to the same
criticism. See supra Section V(C).
305. As discussed supra Section III(A), other methods of avoiding "mandatory" terms
include changes in form and capital structure.
306. See supra notes 239-44 and accompanying text.
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mandatory federal rules as against both mandatory state rules and pri-
vate ordering.3 °7 Conversely, contractarians support state law rules at
the same time as they argue for private ordering.
The anti-contractarians' criticism of state law stems from a widely
cited 1974 article by Professor William Cary.3" 8 Professor Cary
argued that states compete for incorporation business by offering
terms that appeal to corporate managers. Cary reasoned that manag-
ers must prefer low standards and that states would compete by offer-
ing managers low standards of care and loyalty. The "race to the
bottom" allegedly emasculates shareholders' interests. Delaware has
won that race. Under this view, state law is not in any sense the result
of a contract vis-a-vis the shareholders. If it is a contract at all, the
anti-contractarians argue, it is one between the managers and the state
that imposes on shareholders terms that are favorable to managers.30 9
The antidote to inefficient state laws, according to the anti-contractari-
ans, must be preemption of the competition through regulation at the
federal level.3"'
The anti-contractarians' view of state law, like their other criticisms
of private ordering, ignores the powerful effects of the financial mar-
kets. The same markets that discipline the selection of contract
terms, 31 1 also discipline the selection of the state of incorporation.3"'
In this view, the selection of the state of incorporation is simply the
selection of a particular standard form corporate contract. Thus,
although managers are active in the selection of the chartering state
and shareholders are passive and rationally ignorant in this process,
the shareholders voluntary contract through their purchase and sale of
corporate shares. Share prices accordingly reflect incorporation
choices, which ultimately provide incentives for managers to choose
307. It seems odd that anti-contractarians would support turning over regulation of the
corporation to the federal government in light of the historical basis of the anti-contractarian
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corporation statutes that take into account shareholder interests. 313
Not only is there no "race to the bottom," but it is not even clear that
Delaware has "won" in any general sense because different corpora-
tions choose different chartering states based on their needs. 314 It fol-
lows that federal regulation of corporate law can only impede the
development of efficient state laws and optimal corporate governance
contracts.
All of this is not necessarily to say that the competition for state
charters produces state laws that perfectly protect shareholder inter-
ests. It has been argued, for example, that state law is shaped to some
extent to suit the interests of lawyers who dominate the process of
corporate code drafting.31 5 If lawyers are favored in code drafting,
one reason why this is not competed away in the corporate chartering
market is that lawyers are given substantial power within corporations
to make chartering decisions. This power cannot be withdrawn with-
out losing some of the advantages of the lawyers' expertise. In other
words, the charter-selection process involves the same tradeoffs of
agency costs and the benefits of using agents that are involved in other
elements of the corporate contract.31 6
The anti-contractarian criticism of state corporation law is wrong
for the additional reason that, while condemning the motivation of
state legislators, it ignores the imperfect motivations of agents of the
federal government.31 7 While federal legislators and regulators may
respond to different interest groups than state legislators, that does not
mean that they are immune from interest group pressure.31 8  For
example, the S.E.C. arguably protects the interests of its chief "clien-
tele," large investment banking firms, resulting in disclosure rules that
313. For a discussion of how adjustments in share prices constrain managers to choose
contract terms that protect shareholders, see supra notes 144, 157-61 and accompanying text.
314. Baysinger and Butler, The Role of Corporate Law, supra note 3, argue that firms will
choose states with "strict" or "liberal" rules in terms of the degree of constraint on managers
according to the relative monitoring capacity of the shareholders. Professor Romano argues that
firms tend to reincorporate in Delaware if they intend to engage in a specific transaction that is
facilitated in that state. Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J.
L. ECON. & ORGAN. 225 (1985).
315. See Macey & Miller, supra note 26. For a theory that state anti-takeover statutes are the
result of lobbying of managers of firms that are dominant in their state of incorporation, see
Romano, supra note 253.
316. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
317. See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1512, arguing that federal regulation is superior to state
regulation because the Supremacy Clause eliminates the incentive to pay side payments to
managers to attract franchise tax revenue. This makes the entirely unwarranted assumption that
both state and federal legislators are acting to maximize government's, rather than their own,
welfare.
318. See Butler, supra note 253.
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Corporate Fiduciary Duties
curb corporate management's monopoly on inside information.3"9
Thus, once again, the anti-contractarians succumb to the nirvana
fallacy.
Under the contractarian approach, there is one important qualifica-
tion to the shareholders' power to choose a standard form. If a corpo-
ration is subject to mandatory fiduciary duties, a strong argument can
be made that reincorporating in a more permissive jurisdiction by less
than a unanimous vote in order to opt out of fiduciary duties would be
an improper "end run" around the statutory limitation on the amend-
ment power.
In conclusion, the federal-state law debate is simply a restatement of
the private ordering debate. The primacy of state law is compelled by
the same arguments that justify reliance on private ordering, including
the efficient functioning of the financial markets. The arguments for
federal regulation are fueled by the same misconceptions regarding
these markets that underlie the anti-contractual position.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that corporate rules ultimately are
and, from an efficiency perspective, should be the product of private
ordering, not government regulation. Even where liability rules are
appropriate, they should be regarded as standard form contractual
provisions that can be drafted around.
Anti-contractarians make a number of critical errors in their argu-
ments against private ordering. First, they begin with the outmoded
concession view of the corporation left over from the dawn of corpo-
rate law. Second, they overemphasize the need for fiduciary duties by
underappreciating the extent of private controls on managerial con-
duct. Third, they mischaracterize the role of liability rules as a limita-
tion on, rather than part of, corporate contracts. Fourth, they
underestimate the power of market forces as a constraint on the devel-
opment of optimal contracts. Among other things, they erroneously
assume that because market forces cannot perfectly discipline manag-
ers, it necessarily follows that the market cannot discipline the devel-
opment of an optimal corporate contract. Fifth, they fail to weigh in
the balance the obvious deficiencies of a regulatory approach. Because
319. Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model with an Application
to Insider Trading, 30 J. L. & ECON. 311 (1986).
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the anti-contractarians are blinded by the supposed problems of pri-
vate ordering, they do not see the real issues concerning opt-out provi-
sions under a private ordering regime, including issues they
mistakenly characterize as arguments against private agreements.
In general, it is time that legal commentators of corporations fully
recognize the contractual nature of the corporation, leave behind early
nineteenth century conceptions of business organization, and stop dis-
cussing corporate law issues in terms that reflect political compromise
rather than respect for private ordering.
